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Chapter I: Introduction  
 
Medieval cognitive psychology is not the most popular topic amongst 
historians of philosophy. The extant scholarship is of a high level, but the 
literature is limited. This thesis is intended, in a modest way, to encourage 
further scholarship in the area.  I will be focusing in particular on the oft-
overlooked topic of singular cognition. Singular cognition is an important 
aspect of any theory of cognition, and I believe the Medievals had significant 
insights that contemporary philosophy can profit from.   
 
In this discussion I hope to highlight the unique analytical rigour with which 
the Medievals approached questions in philosophy of cognition. Medieval 
philosophy is often charged with taking a cumbersome and inadequate 
metaphysical framework and forcing it upon problems that require much 
subtler treatment.1 I would like to show that, whilst not totally avoiding 
philosophical error, the Medievals provided the sort of nuanced treatment of 
these matters that one finds in contemporary philosophy.2 They were very 
                                                   
1 Cf. John Haldane, ‘The Breakdown of Contemporary Philosophy of Mind’, in John Haldane 
(ed.) Mind, Metaphysics and Value in the Analytic and Thomistic Traditions (Notre Dame: 
Notre Dame University Press, 2002), p.73.  
2 Concerning the Scholastic philosopher John Duns Scotus, Richard Cross remarks: “Scotus’s 
way of proceeding…is recognizably analogous to those practiced by analytic philosophers: 
extreme care with logical form, precision in determining the senses of the terms (technical 
and other) used in the discussion, and so on. In fact, Scotus…[often] has the tools to answer 
seemingly very modern questions in (say) analytic metaphysics or philosophical psychology 
even if his own discussions do not take these questions as their starting point.” Richard Cross, 
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aware of the key problems needing to be resolved in philosophical psychology. 
They dealt with these problems directly, though some more successfully than 
others. With this thesis I aim to highlight the subtlety and ingenuity of 
medieval solutions to some of the key problems in philosophy of mind.  
 
In this chapter I will introduce the area of medieval cognitive psychology – a 
sub-topic of medieval philosophy defined by its origins in Aristotle. I will state 
the ‘problem’ of singular cognition, something that the Medievals inherited 
from Aristotle. I will examine the limited secondary literature on medieval 
theories of singular cognition, and suggest that modern scholars have 
overlooked certain issues inherent in the cognitive psychology of key medieval 
philosophers. Lastly, I will consider how we can profitably compare the 
problem at hand with what at first seems an unrelated problem – 20th century 
philosopher Wilfred Sellars’ notion of the ‘Myth of the Given’. Such a 
comparison will be helpful in clarifying the key issues that Aquinas, Scotus 
and Ockham were trying to deal with.  
 
1. Medieval cognitive psychology:  
 
To begin our discussion it will help to examine how medieval cognitive 
psychology differs from contemporary philosophy of mind. The reality is that 
the Medievals approached this sub-discipline of philosophy with very different 
metaphysical assumptions than those of contemporary philosophers. The 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘Duns Scotus: Some Recent Research’, in The Journal of the History of Philosophy 43, no.3 
(2011), pp.271-295.  
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rational psychology of the high Middle Ages was focused largely on developing 
Aristotle’s writings on cognition. The Scholastic philosophical method had as 
a defining characteristic a unique emphasis on exegesis. The Scholastics did 
philosophy largely by writing commentaries on the works of established 
authorities – and for rational psychology, Aristotle was the most significant 
authority.3 
 
A corollary to this was that the Medievals generally made the same broad 
metaphysical assumptions. They adopted the key tenets of Aristotelian 
hylomorphic conception of the natural world. Furthermore, they shared as an 
aim the achievement of a synthesis of Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic 
philosophy (and in turn, a synthesis of this philosophical system with the 
doctrines of the Catholic faith). The shared assumptions and motivations of 
medieval philosophy stand in significant contrast to the varied metaphysical 
assumptions of contemporary philosophers involved in philosophy of 
cognition.4  
 
                                                   
3 Much attention was also given to Plato, but, in regard to philosophy of cognition, not as 
much as to Aristotle. Augustine, Avicenna and Averroes were also given significant attention. 
But these philosophers were themselves drawing heavily upon Plato and Aristotle.  
4 For a useful taxonomy of contemporary philosophy of perception, see William Fish, 
Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2010). Fish 
divides contemporary philosophy of perception into the following five categories: sense-data 
theories, adverbial theories, belief acquisition theories, intentional theories and disjunctivist 
theories. For a taxonomy of views on the so-called ‘mind-body problem’, see Kirk Ludwig, 
‘The Mind-Body Problem: An Overview’, in Stephen P. Sitch and Ted A. Warfield (eds.) The 
Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp.1-46.  
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Concerning anthropology and philosophical psychology, the Medievals 
adopted the broad contours of Aristotle’s philosophy of soul (outlined in key 
texts such as De Anima). The soul, on this conception, is the form or 
structuring principle of the body. The soul is different from the forms of 
inanimate objects, for it is an animating principle. It gives life to the body by 
providing it with different vital capacities. Aristotle divided the various 
capacities of the soul into three categories – vegetative, appetitive and 
intellectual. Vegetative capacities include functions like self-nourishment and 
growth, appetitive capacities operations such as sensation and imagination, 
and intellectual capacities functions such as understanding, abstract memory, 
and free-will. Cognitive psychology as a discipline concerned itself with the 
mechanisms by which we come to acquire and process information about the 
external world. These mechanisms were either sensory or intellectual; hence 
the discipline of cognitive psychology was focused on the appetitive and 
intellectual capacities of the person.  
 
According to the Medievals, there was a need to discuss cognitive psychology 
in terms of ‘faculties’ or ‘powers’ of the soul. These faculties were the only 
means by which we could get clear on the metaphysics of the mind. Each 
capacity was said to perform some crucial metaphysical function in cognition. 
We needed a notion of sensitive capacities, as these explained the 
phenomenon of perception and imagination, and we needed a notion of 
intellectual capacities, as this provided us with an explanation for the 
phenomena of understanding, judgement and ratiocination.  
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The Scholastics argued that our non-intellectual psychological capacities 
operated in an embodied context. That is to say, the appetitive capacities of 
sensation, perception and imagination require a body. This might seem 
counterintuitive considering the prior claim that vital faculties inhere in the 
soul, not the body. But for Aristotle, it is a logical consequence of his notion of 
hylomorphism.5 The human soul and the body naturally form a composite – 
the human person. The faculties of the soul operate in an embodied context, 
precisely because the soul itself is instantiated in matter.6 
 
This brings us to what is perhaps the key difference between medieval 
cognitive psychology and contemporary philosophy of mind. Unlike 
contemporary philosophy of mind, the ‘mind-body’ problem – as it 
understood in contemporary philosophical terminology – was not a major 
concern. In contemporary metaphysics a strict dualism is usually set up 
between physical properties and mental properties.7 The two kinds of 
                                                   
5 Hylomorphism as a metaphysical position rests on two complementary claims: first, that all 
material beings (including human persons) are necessarily composed of matter and form; and 
second, that both the matter and form of any particular material being are metaphysically 
dependent upon the matter-form composite which they serve to constitute. (Hence, according 
to this second thesis, a human person is metaphysically more fundamental than his/her 
matter and form). The second claim grates against the widely held belief in analytic 
community that parts are always more fundamental than there wholes. But it would take a 
whole other paper to defend it. For the purposes of this thesis I will assume it to be correct.  
6 The notion of the active intellect (intellectus agens) is an exception to this rule.  
7 For a useful discussion of the distinction between contemporary and Aristotelian/scholastic 
conceptions of the mind and body, see Alan Code and Julian Moravcsik, ‘Explaining Various 
Forms of Living’, in Martha Nussbaum and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (eds.) Essays on 
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properties are utterly distinct and seemingly incapable of interaction. This is 
essentially what underpins the mind-body problem.8 
 
Aristotelian metaphysics, in contrast, conceives of the soul and the body as a 
composite. All our vital powers, despite having their origin in the soul, are 
attributable to the human person as a whole – a composite of body and soul. 
There is no need to talk about interaction between the two, as they are not two 
distinct substances but rather a metaphysical composite9 – namely, a human 
                                                                                                                                                 
Aristotle’s De Anima (London: Oxford, 1995), pp.129-146. As Code and Moravcsik explain, 
“Aristotle himself does not have a sharp contrast between the psychological and the physical 
because, in so far as he has a conception of the physical, the physical is just the natural, and so 
he treats the psychological as a part of the physical.” In relevant respects this applies to the 
Scholastics as well.    
8 For the sake of clarification: The contemporary understanding of the mind body-problem, as 
I am interpreting it here, centres mainly on the following question: ‘How do mental properties 
and physical properties – so radically different from each other – interact?’ I concede that this 
is a highly simplified account of the mind-body problem. It is, however, sufficient for the 
purposes of this introductory chapter.  
9 It is important to distinguish between the notion of ‘metaphysical composites’ and the idea 
of ‘mereological composites’. The main difference is that metaphysical composites can be 
more fundamental than their parts (hence matter and form cannot exist on their own without 
the substance that they are a ‘metaphysical part’ of) while other sorts of composites 
(mereological composites) are less fundamental than their parts. For a detailed explanation 
and defence of this distinction, see Alfred Freddoso’s essay “Suarez on metaphysical enquiry, 
efficient causality, and divine action” in Francisco Suarez, On Creation, Conservation and 
Concurrence: Metaphysical Disputations 20-22 trans. Alfred Freddoso (South Bend, IN: St. 
Augustine’s Press, 2002), pp. xi-cxxiii. 
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being. The notion of the human being – a composite of the two – dissolves the 
gap between mind and matter posited by Descartes. We can attribute 
psychological activity to human organs, whilst still retaining non-reductive 
descriptions. When we use psychological vocabulary, we are not just referring 
to elementary matter, but rather the informed matter constitutive of the 
human being.  
 
Much more could be said about this, but I wish rather to highlight an 
exception to this idea of the embodied soul. The Medievals believed that the 
rational dimension of the soul – the sum total of all strictly rational faculties 
of the human person – could operate independently of the body, and indeed 
did post-mortem. Operations such as understanding and reasoning were said 
to occur in an immaterial realm of abstract entities. The intellect was for High 
Medieval philosophers a kind of immanentised Platonic realm of the forms. 
One of the motivations behind this claim was the need to make space for the 
Catholic doctrine of the immortality of the soul. If the Scholastic Aristotelian 
system was to be compatible with Christian belief, some aspect of the 
Aristotelian soul needed to be ‘spiritual’ and ‘incorruptible’.  
 
As part of their development of their notion of the intellect, the Medievals had 
to explain how information from the sensory realm got into the realm of pure 
rationality. As we have seen, they were already committed to saying the 
intellect could operate without a material substrate; some even stated 
explicitly that the intellect did not deal with singular material objects but 
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rather exclusively with abstract universals.10 There was a need to reconcile 
these claims with what was as patently evident then as it is now: we are 
capable of at least some kind of cognitive grasp of singular, material objects.  
 
2. The problem of singular cognition:11  
 
This brings us to the problem of singular cognition. If it is true that the mind 
operates in a kind of abstract intellectual realm, then how can it comprehend 
objects that are inherently non-abstract and non-semantic? Importantly, this 
is not a problem confined to medieval scholastic philosophy. It is evident from 
simple reflection. When asked about their intuitions on the topic, a non-
philosophical audience would probably say they have the ability to form 
concepts of individual objects. After all, we constantly experience this in our 
everyday perceptual activities. A closer inspection, however, reveals a problem. 
How can we be sure we are grasping some individual ‘x’, in its individuality, to 
the exclusion of all others? When I perceive some individual horse, it is 
conceivable that this horse could be substituted for a very similar horse and I 
wouldn’t notice. Are we really, then, grasping an individual? There is even 
                                                   
10 See, for example, Aquinas’s assertions in Sententia Libri De Anima, 2.12 (XLV, p.115).   
11 It is important to note, from the outset, the definition I am giving to the word ‘knowledge’ 
whenever I use it in this thesis. I am not referring to what the Scholastics would call ‘scientia’ 
(scientific knowledge). I am rather referring to the formation of a basic concept of something. 
This is the kind of lay-person’s sense of the term ‘knowledge’. On this conception, knowledge 
is, roughly speaking, the primitive conceptualization of some entity, be it abstract or concrete, 
mental or extramental.  
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another prior issue: we need to defend the position that we have a capacity to 
form non-general concepts. Some Medieval philosophers seem to deny this.   
 
In describing this problem it is useful to compare it to its complement: the 
problem of universals. The so-called ‘problem of universals’ is about 
explaining how we come to gain universal knowledge when all our data is 
(arguably) received from individual objects. Where are these so-called 
universals?12 For the problem of singulars, it is the opposite. It is clear that 
singulars exist out there in the world, but we don’t quite know how we come to 
know them. How is it that we are able to form concepts that pick out 
individual objects to the exclusion of all others? How is it that we can even 
form an abstract concept of something that is by definition material?    
 
Modern philosophers address this question within their own specific 
frameworks. This much is trivial. Some are inclined to adopt a ‘linguistic’ 
approach to analysing thought, such that thought is described in terms of 
different kinds of syntactically structured propositions. Singular thoughts, on 
this account, are the referents of singular terms employed in mental 
propositions. Other philosophers choose to develop an account of thought that 
takes ‘intentionality’ to be fundamental. Intentionality is the unique property 
of ‘aboutness’ that one finds in entities of the mind – thoughts, judgements, 
feelings, beliefs, are all about or directed at objects. On an intentional account 
                                                   
12 For a useful summary of the various issues surrounding the so-called problem of universals, 
see Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, ‘What is the Problem of Universals?’, in Mind 109, no.434 
(2000), pp.255-273. 
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of singular thought, singular thoughts are those that are about or reach out to 
individual objects in the external world.13  
 
Just like philosophers today, the Scholastics addressed the question of 
singular thought within their own framework – namely, their Aristotelian 
metaphysical worldview. For the Medievals, though, there was a complicating 
factor. Aristotle on a number of occasions stated categorically that ‘the mind 
knows universals, the senses particulars’.14 Aristotle was basing this statement 
on his hylomorphic conception of cognition, whereby the mind comes to know 
the external world by receiving the forms of the world in an immaterial, 
universal mode. If we are limited to receiving information in a dematerialized 
abstract way, cognition of material singulars seems impossible.  
 
As a consequence of this, medieval responses to the problem of singular 
cognition focused largely on introducing some sort of nuance into Aristotle’s 
sweeping maxim. Somehow or other it needed to allow for a knowledge of 
singular objects, even if this knowledge was different and less vivid than the 
kind of knowledge we have of universal objects. In this thesis I will discuss the 
different attempts at explicating Aristotle’s maxim.  
 
                                                   
13 The broad dichotomy I have drawn between linguistic and phenomenological approaches is 
developed in detail in Tim Crane’s paper ‘The Singularity of Singular Thought’, Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85, no.1 (2011), pp.21-43.  
14 De Anima, II.5, 417b23; Posterior Analytics, 87b37-38. These and all subsequent references 
to Aristotle are based on English translations from The Works of Aristotle, trans. Wilfred D. 
Ross, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952). 
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I will focus in particular on the way that three of the Medievals attempted to 
solve this problem. These three are namely Aquinas, Ockham and Scotus. I 
have chosen them for two principal reasons: firstly because it is simply not 
feasible in the space of a 30,000 word thesis to try to discuss in depth the 
work of more than three of these figures. And secondly, because these three 
‘towering’ figures in the history of medieval cognitive psychology were the 
most influential, and arguably provided the most sophisticated accounts of 
singular cognition.15 
  
Aquinas was a pioneering figure in cognitive psychology and developed a 
systematic account of processes of cognition, in such a way that he remained 
rigorously loyal to Aristotle’s original system. He chose to provide a more 
literal interpretation of Aristotle than those who came after him.16 Duns 
Scotus identified what I will argue are genuine shortcomings in Aquinas’s 
account. Scotus proposed solutions to the errors in Aquinas’s account, most 
well known of which is his notion of intuitive cognition. Ockham developed 
this notion, but made it part of his distinctly anti-metaphysical account of 
cognition. I intend to follow the dialectic between these three philosophers, 
                                                   
15 Leading medieval scholars such as Sebastian Day and Peter King adopt this approach, and I 
think it wise one. See Sebastian J. Day, Intuitive Cognition: A Key to the Significance of the 
Later Scholastics (New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1947), and Peter King, “Thinking 
About Things”, in Gyula Klima (ed.), Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in 
Medieval Philosophy (New York: Fordam University Press, forthcoming); “The Inner 
Cathedral: Mental Architecture in High Scholasticism”, in Vivarium vol.46, issue 3 (2008), 
p.263-266. 
16 Note that this claim and the others made in this paragraph will be developed in detail in the 
subsequent chapters of this thesis. I will refrain from unnecessary referencing here.  
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and suggest that Scotus over the others provided the most plausible account of 
singular cognition. I will, at the same time, acknowledge the fragmentary way 
in which Scotus developed his account, and suggest that it is need of further 
scholarly exegesis.  
 
3. Existing literature:  
 
Extant literature on singular cognition has as a central focus the relationship 
between the knowledge of singulars and scepticism. Those with Thomistic 
sympathies seem to portray Aquinas’s account of singular knowledge as a 
safeguard against anti-realism. The notion of intuitive cognition17 is portrayed 
as undermining a defensible account of mind-world isomorphism.18 On the 
other extreme of the spectrum, philosophers like Berube and Normore suggest 
the theory of intuitive cognition was a brilliant insight that rightly emphasised 
the role of singular objects as the ground and reference point of our 
knowledge of the world. I will briefly survey this literature with a view to 
showing, in later chapters, that the authors go too far to one or other extreme 
of the spectrum of views on singular cognition.  
                                                   
17 The notion of intuitive cognition is explained at length in chapters III and IV. In brief, 
intuitive cognition refers to the idea that we are capable of cognizing singular objects as 
existing and present. It is opposed to the notion of abstractive cognition, according to which 
we are said to abstract the essence of singular objects, and cognize the nature of those objects 
without any attendant judgment of existence or presence.  
18 By mind-world isomorphism, I am referring to the view that in cognition the mind enters 
into a relationship of structural identity with the external world. This notion will be developed 
in detail in later chapters.  
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For authors like Gilson and Anthony Kenny the primary concern is to preserve 
a kind of epistemological realism.19 In his Unity of Philosophical Experience, 
Gilson presents a critique of Ockham’s theory of singular cognition.20 Echoing 
a criticism of commentators before him, Gilson questions Ockham’s assertion 
that we can have ‘intuitive cognitions’ of non-existent objects. Ockham’s 
account of cognition, Gilson claims, fails to ensure the objectivity of our 
knowledge of the external world. It is premised upon the idea of intuitive 
cognition, and we can never be entirely sure of the accuracy of these intuitive 
cognitions. Kenny offers a similar criticism, except in relation to Scotus’s 
theory of cognition. Scotus, like Ockham, claimed that we could have intuitive 
cognition of material particulars. Though Scotus did not explicitly make the 
same claim as Ockham concerning knowledge of non-existents, Kenny 
nevertheless argues that it is implicit in his writing: “there is a possibility of 
such an object being in the intellect and not existing in reality…a possibility 
which Aquinas’ theory was careful to avoid”.21 Kenny suggests that this is 
sufficient justification to adopt a Thomistic theory of singular knowledge over 
a Scotistic account.  
                                                   
19 By epistemological realism, I am referring to the view that we are able to apprehend objects 
that exist independently of conceptualization of them. This position can be contrasted with 
epistemological idealism, the view, roughly speaking, that the only entities in existence are 
those that exist at the level of the mind (or a ‘conceptual’ or ‘semantic’ level, depending on 
how you wish to construe the position).  
20 Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: Ignatius, 1999), part one, 
chapters III and IV. 
21 Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind (London: Routledge, 1992), p.114.  
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To the other side of the spectrum, there are scholars who suggest that the 
notion of ‘abstractive cognition’ itself leads to representationalism. On this 
account, advanced by philosophers such as Robert Pasnau, an intellectual 
realm of ‘abstracted essences’ separates the mind from the world rather than 
providing us with access to it. According to Pasnau, the intelligible species (a 
mental representation said to be the vehicle of primitive acts of cognition) 
ends up becoming the object of cognition and prevents us from accessing 
objects in themselves.22 Pasnau applauds Ockham and Olivi for displacing this 
problematic conception of cognition: "Olivi and Ockham deserve substantial 
credit for attempting to displace this seductive but misleading picture of the 
mind."23 Pasnau suggests that Ockham’s reductive conception of cognition (to 
be explained in chapter V) is far more promising. 
 
Whilst Pasnau focuses on cognition in general, there are also those who focus 
specifically on Ockham’s theory of singular cognition, commending him for 
making this operation central to his account of human cognitive psychology. 
Authors like Calvin Normore and Camille Bérubé develop a narrative of high 
medieval theories of cognition in which Ockham is the preeminent figure.24 
                                                   
22 Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), p.26: “Aquinas, I will argue, was committed, as were most of the 
Scholastics, to introducing such intermediaries into the cognition process.”  
23 Pasnau, 1997, p.26.  
24 Calvin Normore, ‘The Invention of Singular Thought’, in Henrik Lagerlund (ed.) Forming 
the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from Avicenna to the 
Medical Enlightenment (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), pp.109-128; Camille Bérubé, La 
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According to this narrative, philosophers like Aquinas, preoccupied with 
trying to provide an account consonant with an Aristotelian understanding of 
science, failed to acknowledge singular cognition as the foundation and 
reference point of all human cognition. Ockham (and to a lesser extent Scotus) 
provided the valuable insight that singular knowledge, achieved by virtue of 
intuitive cognition, is the bedrock of all other knowledge.  
 
In this thesis I will argue a position somewhat similar to Normore and Bérubé, 
though placing greater emphasis on Scotus’s contribution. It is my view that 
Scotus and Ockham were right to emphasise the importance of knowledge of 
singulars in cognition. And furthermore, they were right to be dissatisfied with 
Aquinas’s attempt to explain singular cognition. However, Ockham’s 
reactionary account of singular cognition veered too far in the direction of 
what is called ‘conceptualism’ – a position that, though not problematic in 
itself, makes it difficult to explain certain aspects of human cognition.25 In 
abandoning the idea of really existing essences, Ockham ruled out one 
                                                                                                                                                 
connaissance de l’Individuel au Moyen Age, (Montreal and Paris: Presses de l’Université de 
Montréal et P.U.F., 1964).  
25 By ‘conceptualism’ I am referring to the view that essences only really have existence in the 
mind. Though concepts of essences may be caused in the mind by the action of external 
objects in perception, essences themselves have no extramental existence. ‘Conceptualism’ in 
the broad sense should not be confused with ‘nominalism’, the position that essences are mere 
mental fictions with no relationship to the world whatsoever. ‘Nominalism’ is a kind of 
conceptualism, but not the only kind. ‘Conceptualism’ for Ockham is different -- he allowed 
for specific causal relationships between classes of extramental objects and the formation of 
corresponding ‘essence concepts’ in the mind. See chapter V for a further discussion of the 
matter.  
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plausible explanation of singular cognition. Forms, according to Aquinas, 
were the bridge between mind and world. Ockham rejected this. Yet His 
alternative theory – underpinned by scepticism about the existence of 
essences – seems rather implausible. Scotus, on the other hand, maintained a 
‘realist’ understanding of essences, and hence was able to retain the plausible 
‘formal reception’ account of singular cognition.  At the same time, he 
provided a more detailed explanation of singular cognition than that of 
Aquinas, and abandoned the problematic aspects of Aquinas’s account. Hence 
I will argue something at least slightly distinct from most views expressed in 
the literature to date – that Scotus provided the most plausible account of 
singular cognition out of any account in the Middle Ages.  
 
4. Singular cognition and the Myth of the Given:  
 
To achieve greater clarity in my discussion, and also to show the 
contemporary relevance of the subject matter of this thesis, I will compare the 
problem under examination to Wilfred Sellars’ notion of ‘The Myth of the 
Given’. ‘The Myth of the Given’, in its most general formulation, refers to the 
mistaken belief that primitive non-propositional data (be it cognitive or 
sensory) is sufficient to act as a foundation for belief. 26 According to Sellars, if 
something is to function as a justification for belief it needs to ‘appear’ in the 
“space of reasons”.27 Sellars describes the conditions of ‘appearance’ 
                                                   
26 I am here paraphrasing Sellars’ claims. There are some who would argue that bare sense 
data are sufficient to act as a basis for propositional knowledge.   
27 Wilfrid Sellars, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1997), p.76.  
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differently in different contexts. At one point he speaks of the inability of non-
conceptualised sense data to figure in cognitive processes. He famously writes, 
“The idea that epistemic facts can be analysed without remainder…into non-
epistemic facts…is, I believe, a radical mistake  -- a mistake of a piece with the 
so-called “naturalistic fallacy” in ethics.”28 Mere sense data, he claims, do not 
possess the properties to figure in justification of truth-claims. Elsewhere29 he 
puts the problem in different terms. If primitive sense data is ‘non-analysable’ 
in the way that propositions are, then there is really no way of telling whether 
or not they justify truth claims. They are utterly unanalysable – we can’t even 
ascertain whether they support basic truth claims.    
 
Sellars’ observation is usually taken to be a claim about epistemic justification. 
Indeed it does concern epistemic warrant, but it has broader implications than 
this. To state the claim again: Sellars draws our attention to the fact that raw 
sense data lack the relevant cognitive properties to be present to the mind. In 
its primitive state such data cannot act as a justification for propositional 
knowledge. A clear consequence is that anyone wishing to develop a coherent 
philosophy of cognition needs to explain how sense data acquire the relevant 
properties – specifically conceptuality and intentionality – so as to appear to 
the mind. This is a question for philosophy of cognition, rather than 
epistemology.30  
                                                   
28 Ibid., p.19. 
29Ibid., pp.18-19.  
30 I am here drawing a distinction between the related disciplines of epistemology and 
philosophy of cognition. While epistemology deals primarily with questions about the 
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Medieval debates about singular cognition were by and large focused on this 
question. Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham were all trying to explain how data 
about singular objects acquired the relevant properties to appear to the 
intellect. They proposed different solutions to this question, with varying 
success. I will examine how plausible each philosopher’s solution to the ‘Myth 
of the Given’ is. The discussion will hopefully be in some way enlightening to 
those interested in Sellars’ observation and related debates.  
 
Incidentally, Sellars explicitly criticised Aquinas’s attempted solution to the 
problem.31  He argued that Aquinas’s notion of the conversio32 confuses the 
senses as causes of cognition with the true acts of cognition. The latter appear 
in the “space of reasons”, while the former remain at a mere sensory level. I 
will examine how John Duns Scotus’s notion of intuitive cognition allows him 
to avoid this error.    
 
5. The structure of this discussion:  
 
In chapter two I will discuss Aquinas’s theory of singular cognition. Aquinas 
believed that the mind could have only an indirect grasp of individuals. He 
developed a theory whereby the mind is able to ‘turn’ to data available in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
justification of beliefs, philosophy of cognition focuses instead on the processes that underpin 
cognitive activity.   
31 See Wilfrid Sellars, ‘Being and Being Known’, in Science, Perception, and Reality (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1963), pp.41-59.  
32 This notion will be explained in the next chapter.  
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higher sense faculties, and in this data perceive the individual. I will argue 
that such a theory contradicts the fundamental tenets of Aquinas’ philosophy 
of mind. In particular, it conflicts with the view that intelligible content is 
available only through a reception of forms into the mind.  
 
In chapter three I will discuss a number of metaphysical and epistemological 
ideas that form the foundation for Scotus’ notion of intuitive cognition. One 
innovation on Aquinas’s system was particularly important. Scotus argued, 
contra Aquinas, that the proper object of the intellect was being (as opposed 
to the essences of material objects). This, we will see, allowed Scotus to 
explain how it was that the intellect could know the individuating notes of 
singular objects. For those who are sufficiently familiar with Scotus’s works, 
this chapter may be skipped; it is intended primarily to provide necessary 
background information on Scotus’s metaphysics and epistemology.  
 
In chapter four I will expound Scotus’s theory of intuitive cognition, and argue 
that it represents a plausible solution to the problem of singular cognition. 
Scotus argues that we are capable of achieving an intellectual intuition of 
singular objects. We do not strictly speaking grasp the objects as distinct from 
every other similar object, but we nevertheless do cognize them as individual 
instantiations of some kind (tokens of a particular type, to borrow a phrase 
from analytic philosophical discourse). Scotus provides a cogent metaphysical 
story for how this kind of cognition takes place. In light of the plausibility of 
Scotus’s account, I suggest that Scotus’s intuitive cognition theory is the most 
promising out of the three major accounts of singular cognition offered in the 
High Middle Ages. 
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In chapter five I will discuss William of Ockham’s revisionist account of 
singular knowledge. Ockham sought simplicity in cognitive psychology and 
rejected Aquinas’s ‘formal reception’ theory as unnecessarily complex. In its 
place he posited two alternative mechanisms facilitating cognition. He argued 
that cognitive acts have similarity relations to classes of objects in the external 
world – this makes our thought-acts to be about particular classes of objects. 
Furthermore, there are lines of causality between individual objects and 
thoughts, and these causal relations allow some of our thoughts to refer to 
individual objects. I will not describe these two mechanisms in any more 
depth here. Suffice to say that I will argue against Ockham’s ‘act’ theory of 
signification. By my lights he fails to explain how cognitive acts can be similar 
to physical objects in the external world.  
 
The order in which I am discussing the three philosophers may appear 
peculiar to some readers. Scotus is, after all, at the end of the dialectic I am 
following – he provides a solution that solves the problems in the accounts of 
the other two philosophers. This much is true, but there are other factors that 
make it necessary to place him second in the discussion. Each philosopher’s 
theory of cognition is based upon the theories of those who preceded him. To 
discuss, for example, Ockham before Scotus, is akin to discussing Aristotle 
without any reference to Plato. Chronological order is crucial if readers are to 
understand the historical background to the three philosophers. Though I am 
not aiming to provide yet another survey of the history of medieval philosophy, 
certain virtues of the historical method still apply. I believe my order of 
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presentation allows for ease of reading and aids the presentation of my 
overarching argument.  
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Chapter II: Aquinas on our knowledge of 
particular objects 
 
Introduction:  
 
Aquinas’s writings on cognition were both profound and hugely influential. 
Aquinas attempted a monumental task – to synthesise Aristotle’s writings on 
cognition with that of the Augustine and the Arab commentators. Many 
accepted his account as authoritative. There were a number of philosophers 
who set about developing elements of Aquinas’s psychology in greater depth.33 
Other scholars, such as Ockham, reacted strongly against Aquinas and set 
about developing an alternative account (see chapter III). Regardless of 
these different reactions, it is clear that Aquinas’s account had a massive 
impact on the direction of medieval studies of cognition.   
 
In this chapter I will offer a brief account of Aquinas’s cognitive psychology, 
focusing specifically on how he explained our cognition of singulars (see 
chapter I, section 2). Aquinas held that the mind was receptive of abstract 
universals alone. It was metaphysically incapable of receiving information 
about particular objects. He attempted to explain cognition of individuals by 
                                                   
33 See, for example, Jean Capreolus, Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis (Tours: 
Touronibus, 1900), and Jean Poinsot, Introduction to the Summa Theologiae of Thomas 
Aquinas: The Isagogue of John of St. Thomas, trans. Ralph McInerny (Ann Arbor: St 
Augustine’s Press, 2004). The Spanish Jesuits Francisco Suarez and Luis de Molina carried 
out a similar project in the late 16th and earlier 17th centuries.   
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positing that the intellect utilized information in the higher sense faculties. On 
his account, particular knowledge was acquired by the mind through an ‘inner 
perception’ of data in the cogitative power (see section 4 for an explanation of 
this theory).  
 
Whilst there are many merits to Aquinas’s account, I believe that he fails to 
give a coherent explanation of singular cognition. I will argue that Aquinas’s 
account of singular knowledge directly contradicts his own account of the 
nature of the intellect. Aquinas asserted the intellect only receives the forms of 
objects. Forms are ultimately essences, and those present in the intellect 
produce an understanding of essences alone. The intellect doesn’t receive any 
data about the individuating notes of a thing. Aquinas attempted to explain 
knowledge of singulars through his theory of the mind ‘indirectly’ accessing 
data from the senses. However, I will argue that this theory either collapses 
into a kind of empiricism or comes into direct conflict with the basic 
principles of his philosophy of mind.    
 
To begin the discussion I will offer a brief overview of Aquinas’s 
understanding of natures and the principle of individuation. This is necessary 
background information to understand his cognitive psychology.34  
                                                   
34 I intend to draw on the later texts of Aquinas -- what we might call his mature thought. In 
particular I will rely on his Summa Theologiae (c.1265-1273) and Sententia Libri De Anima (c. 
1268). I do not know of any philosophers who have argued that Aquinas changed his mind on 
the way human beings engage in singular cognition in this life. Georgio Pini points out that 
Aquinas changed his mind on a number of key topics, but this is not one of them. See Georgio 
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1. Natures, universals and essences: 
 
The term nature (natura) has a number of meanings – as Aquinas 
acknowledges in Commentary on the Metaphysics35 - but there is one 
particular meaning that is relevant to us here. In this discussion we are 
concerned with natures as mere structures, prior to any mode of existence in 
the world. Natures, in this sense, are what Avicenna was referring to when he 
stated “equinity is just equinity; of itself it is neither one nor many, universal 
nor singular”.36 Natures per se prescind from any particular instantiation in 
reality. They are just species, considered in isolation from any mode of 
existence they might come to have. Examples include ‘humanity’ and 
‘equinity’, considered in the abstract.  
 
Natures, writes Aquinas, can take on two modes of being in the world.37 First, 
they can exist as the essences of individual material entities, such as this man 
or this horse. These natures have been ‘individualised’ (see section 2). Second, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Pini, “The development of Aquinas’s Thought” in Brian Davies and Eleonore Stump (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).  
35 In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, 5.5, n.808-826. All my number 
references for Aquinas’s Metaphysics refer to John P. Rowan O.P’s authorative translation, 
Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle (2 vols) trans. by John P. Rowan (Chicago: 
Regnery, 1961). 
36 Avicenna, Metaphysics, 5 86va. The translation has been taken from The Metaphysics of the 
Healing, trans. Michael E. Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2005). 
37 Sententia Libri De Anima, 2.12, n.95-151 (XLV, pp.115-116). All references, aside from those 
for Metaphysics and the Fourth book of the Sentences, are to the Leonine edition (1882-).  
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they can exist as universals in the mind. These natures are universals – they 
are abstract mental entities unbound by any particular spatiotemporal 
dimensions.  
 
Aquinas writes of the different senses of natura in On Being and Essence. He 
observes that we can consider natures in the abstract, neither instantiated in a 
material being nor existing as mental entity:  
“In one way [a nature] can be considered according to its proper 
content, and this is an absolute consideration of it. And in this way 
nothing is true of it except what belongs to it as such; whence if 
anything else is attributed to it, the attribution is false.”38  
He later remarks on the two ways natures can exist in reality:  
“This nature has a twofold existence, one in singular things, the other 
in the soul; and accidents follow upon the nature according to either 
existence. In singular things it has a multiple existence in accord with 
the diversity of these singular things; yet the existence of none of these 
things belongs to the nature considered in itself, i.e., absolutely.”39 
                                                   
38 De Ente et Essentia, 3, n.25-33: “Uno modo secundum rationem propriam, et hec est 
absoluta consideratio ipsius: et hoc modo nihil est verum de ea nisi quod convenit sibi 
secundum quod huiusmodi; unde quicquid aliorum attribuatur sibi, falsa erit attributio”. 
(XLIII, p.374).  
39 Ibid., n.51-58: “Haec autem natura duplex habet esse, unum in singularibus et aliud in 
anima, et secundum utrumque consequuntur dictam naturam accidentia. Et in singularibus 
etiam habet multiplex esse secundum singularium diversitatem et tamen ipsi naturae 
secundum suam primam considerationem, scilicet absolutam, nullum istorum esse debetur.” 
(XLIII, p.374). For a good explanation of Aquinas’s position, see Joseph Owens, St Thomas 
Aquinas on the Existence of God (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), pg. 88.  
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Nature, then, is a basic metaphysical category under which universals and the 
essences of material objects fall.   
 
Universals, as Aquinas outlined, are natures qua grasped in the mind. They 
have the same essential content as the natures of entities in the external world, 
but they have a different mode of being, namely mental being. The important 
point here is that Aquinas did not, like Plato, locate universals in a realm of 
the forms. Nor did he locate universals in objects of the external world. 
Strictly speaking, universals only exist in the mind:  
“So in this way it is clear that the notion of universality can be attributed to a 
common nature only as regards its existence in the intellect”.   
.40 Natures certainly exist in both the external world and the mind, but 
universals do not.41  
 
The type-token distinction,42 then, is not between universals and particulars 
but rather natures qua uninstantiated structures and natures qua conjoined to 
matter. The essences of objects, according to Aquinas, are specific 
instantiations of natures, not universals. In the metaphysical ‘process’ of 
                                                   
40 “Sic igitur patet, quod naturae communi non potest attribui intentio universalitatis nisi 
secundum esse quod habet in intellectu”. Sententia Libri De Anima, 2.12, n.139-140 (XLV, 
p.116).  
41 There is, however, a relevant connection between natures in the world and universals. 
Natures in the world “are conceivable universally”, and it is for this reason that we often apply 
universal terms like ‘man’ or ‘horse’ to individuals. Or so Aquinas argues in 2.12 of the 
Sententia Libri De Anima (XLV, pp.115-117). Cf. In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum 
Aristotelis expositio, 7.11, n. 1524 and 1536, De Ente et Essentia, 3, n.56-57. 
42 See introduction, section 3.  
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individuation, a nature is ‘conjoined’ with accidental, material features. The 
nature is no longer a mere structure. It takes on a ‘material mode of being’ as 
the essence of a particular object.43   
 
2. Individuation:  
 
Aquinas asserted that matter is the principle of individuation.44 Matter is that 
which gives particular spatiotemporal dimensions to a nature, and hence 
distinguishes one instance of a nature from another. Matter, in this sense, 
provides ‘numerical difference’. It gives a unique spatiotemporal character to 
each token. It does not, however, provide ‘specific difference’. Even though 
individual instances of natures have different spatiotemporal dimensions, 
they remain tokens of the same type.  
 
Aquinas’s position on individuation had a major impact on his theory of 
knowledge of particulars. Aquinas asserted that matter is unintelligible to us 
because it cannot be received (recipitur) by the immaterial intellect.45 As a 
                                                   
43 Cf. Sententia Libri De Anima, 2.12, n.102-107 (XLV, p.116): “Ista autem natura, cui advenit 
intentio universalitatis, puta natura hominis, habet duplex esse: unum quidem materiale, 
secundum quod est in materia naturali; aliud autem immateriale, secundum quod est in 
intellectu.” 
44 De Ente et Essentia, 3, n.51-71 (XLIII, p.374). Cf. Super Boethium De Trinitate, 2.2. There 
is a debate here, going beyond the scope of this thesis, as to whether the principle of 
individuation is determinate matter (materia signata) or indeterminate matter (materia 
indeterminata). Aquinas puts forward the former view in De Ente et Essentia, and the latter 
in De Trinitate.  
45 Summa Theologiae, I 85.1, 86.1. (V, pp.330-333, 347-349). 
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result, we are unable to grasp singular objects directly. Aquinas was left with 
the quandary of explaining how we cognize individual objects. 
  
3. Aquinas on cognition: 
 
Aquinas adopted the Aristotelian maxim that the intellect knows universals 
while the senses know particulars. This is a key difference between his theory 
and that of Scotus and Ockham. The latter two chose to nuance Aristotle’s 
maxim. Aquinas accepted it in its most literal formulation. He developed a 
theory to fit with a literal interpretation, rather than reinterpreting Aristotle to 
fit with his theory.46  
 
Drawing on Aristotle’s maxim, Aquinas asserted that the proper objects of the 
intellect are the essences of material objects: “the created intellect is naturally 
capable of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being 
abstractedly, by way of a kind of resolution of parts”.47 He expounded a theory 
                                                   
46 Sententia Libri De Anima 2.12, n.70-95 (XLV, p.115): Aquinas enquires as to “why 
sensation is of individual things, whereas science is of universals”. His answer is that the 
senses receive forms still individuated by matter, whereas the intellect receives them 
abstracted from their material, individuating features.  
47 Summa Theologiae I 12.4, ad.3 (IV, pp.120-123). In context, the Latin reads, “Et ideo, cum 
intellectus creatus per suam naturam natus sit apprehendere formam concretam et esse 
concretum in abstractione, per modum resolutionis cuiusdam, potest per gratiam elevari ut 
cognoscat substantiam separatam subsistentem, et esse separatum subsistens.” Cf. 
Commentary on the Metaphysics, 2.1, n.285. Later in the Summa Theologiae Aquinas 
explicitly states what the proper object is: “the proper object of the human intellect, which is 
united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter” (1.84.7) (V, pp.325-328).  
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of universal knowledge whereby the mind grasps essences in the abstract. I 
will here briefly reiterate the rudiments of Aquinas’s cognitive psychology, 
assuming that readers have had at least some exposure to Aquinas’s 
philosophy of cognition. 
 
Aquinas was concerned with explaining how the mind could grasp the essence 
of objects in the external world separated from all material individuating 
features. To do this he developed a theory of ‘intellectual abstraction’, whereby 
the mind abstracts the nature of an object from detailed sense representations.  
 
The process of cognition begins with the reception of data from the external 
world by the five senses. Two powers, the ‘common sense’ and the ‘cogitative 
power’, take this data and synthesise it into different ‘unified experiences’ of 
objects (what Aquinas called ‘phantasms’ (phantasmata)).48 It is important to 
note here how phantasms are representations of specific objects, not 
generalized images of the surrounding environment. Phantasms, in this sense, 
provide the mind with the raw material for ‘simple’ or ‘objectual’ 
apprehension (the grasping of the nature of an object).49  
 
                                                   
48 For an explanation of the notion of the common sense, see Summa Theologiae 1.78.4, ad.2. 
For the cogitative power, see Sententia Libri De Anima, 2.13, n.192-201. (XLV, pp.121-122). 
49 Perhaps the most informative passages on phantasms are Super III Sententiarum, d.23, q.1, 
art.2, and Summa Theologiae I 84.7, particularly ad.2. In the latter passage, Aquinas 
describes a phantasm (sometimes translated as “image”) as “the likeness of a particular thing” 
(“phantasma est similitudo rei particularis”) (V, p.325).  
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Each phantasm is ‘presented’ to the mind, whereby the active component of 
the mind – the agent intellect (intellectus agens) – is able to abstract the 
essence or form of the object under consideration. The active intellect is the 
faculty which makes “things sensible…actually intelligible by way of 
abstraction”.50 The abstracted form is received by the ‘knowing’ part of the 
mind, the ‘passive intellect’ (intellectus possibilis).51 It is at this point that 
cognition occurs.  
 
4.1: The problem of particulars: 
 
As stated earlier, Aquinas believed that the intellect grasps natures abstracted 
from their individuating features. Thus natures are the intellect’s proper 
object. There is an obvious problem that arises from this: The mind is unable 
to grasp any singular objects. As Aquinas himself states, the intellect receives 
all information in an immaterial manner, according to its own immaterial 
mode of being.52 Hence it seems metaphysically impossible for the intellect to 
grasp information about material particulars. Aquinas needed to resolve this 
issue if he was to explain singular knowledge.  
 
                                                   
50 Summa Theologiae I 79.3, ad.3. (V, p.264-265). The full response reads: “Intelligibile 
autem in actu non est aliquid existens in rerum natura, quantum ad naturam rerum 
sensibilium, quae non subsistunt praeter materiam. Et ideo ad intelligendum non sufficeret 
immaterialitas intellectus possibilis, nisi adesset intellectus agens, qui faceret intelligibilia in 
actu per modum abstractionis.” 
51 Summa Theologiae I 79.4, ad.4. (V, p.268) 
52 Sententia Libri De Anima, 2.12 (XLV, p.115) 
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Aquinas proposed two related solutions (at different times in his work). One 
of these is the theory of the conversio ad phatasmata. According to this 
theory, the mind is able to ‘intellectually perceive’ the phantasms from which 
species have been abstracted, and in doing so achieve at least some knowledge 
of particular objects (this will be further discussed in section 2). The other 
solution is that the ‘cogitative power’ is able to cognize individual objects, 
despite being a faculty of the senses (this theory is discussed in section 3). In 
the remainder of this chapter, I aim to show that both of these solutions are in 
direct conflict with Aquinas’s contention that the mind knows universals and 
not particulars. They are ultimately inconsistent with his metaphysics of mind.  
 
4.2 The conversio ad phantasmata:  
 
The term conversio ad phantasmata literally translates as a “return to the 
phantasms”. ‘Conversio’ is the most common term used by Aquinas to 
describe this operation. Less frequently he would employ visual metaphors to 
describe the process. As Scapelli Cory observes, “[according to Aquinas] the 
intellect “gazes at,” “looks back toward,” or “looks toward” (inspicit, respicit, 
aspicit) the phantasms, or “beholds” (speculat) the nature in them.”53 
 
The conversio ad phantasmata is the cognitive operation by which the mind 
comes to know singular objects. It has additional functions to this, but in the 
                                                   
53 Therese Scarpelli Cory, ‘What is an Intellectual “Turn”? The Liber De Causis, Avicenna, and 
Aquinas’s Turn to the Phantasms’, Topicos Revista De Filosofia 45 (2013), pp.131-132. For the 
relevant texts in Aquinas, see Super II Sententiarum, d.20, q.2, art.2, ad. 3, Super IV 
Sententiarum d.50, q.1, art.2, and Summa Theologiae I 84.7 (V, 325-326). 
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context of cognition of particulars this is its role – it is the means by which we 
are able to apprehend concrete material entities. In the conversio, the mind’s 
focus is directed towards a sensorial representation from which it has initially 
drawn some universal. By ‘looking at’, ‘gazing at’ or ‘beholding’ the phantasm, 
the mind comes to perceive a particular instantiation of a nature that it has 
grasped. Hence Aquinas writes,  
 “our intellect knows directly the universal only. But indirectly, and as 
it were by a kind of reflection, it can know the singular, because, as we 
have said above (1.85.7), even after abstracting the intelligible species, 
the intellect, in order to understand, needs to turn to the phantasms in 
which it understands the species, as is said De Anima iii, 7. Therefore 
it understands the universal directly through the intelligible species, 
and indirectly the singular represented by the phantasm. And thus it 
forms the proposition ‘Socrates is a man’.”54  
Aquinas, then, believed that this operation gives the intellect an indirect grasp 
of individual material objects.     
 
                                                   
54 Summa Theologiae I 86.1: “Intellectus noster directe non est cognoscitivus nisi 
universalium. Indirecte autem, et quasi per quandam reflexionem, potest cognoscere 
singulare, quia, sicut supra dictum est, etiam postquam species intelligibiles abstraxit, non 
potest secundum eas actu intelligere nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata, in quibus species 
intelligibiles intelligit, ut dicitur in III de anima. Sic igitur ipsum universale per speciem 
intelligibilem directe intelligit; indirecte autem singularia, quorum sunt phantasmata. Et hoc 
modo format hanc propositionem, ‘Socrates est homo’.”  (V, p.347). Translation taken from 
The Summa Theologica, trans. the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: 
Benzinger Brothers, 1947-8).   
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Some interpreters have described the conversio ad phantasmata as a ‘process’ 
by which the mind actually ‘turns’ its attention towards individual objects. 
Pasnau, for example, describes the conversio as a process in which the 
intellect shifts its attention to particular examples so as to relate universal 
concepts back to reality. Thus Pasnau writes: “Given that the intellect’s role is 
to understand universal natures as existing in a particular, it is only to be 
expected that the intellect is constantly casting its attention on those 
particulars. Since the intellect itself cannot directly apprehend particulars 
(Summa Theologica 1.86 .1), this implies that it must turn toward the senses, 
constantly.”55 On this interpretation the conversio is an ongoing operation in 
which the mind frequently switches its focus between the universal and the 
phantasm. 
 
Others argue that the conversio is a state rather than a process. As Cory, 
Stump and Kretzmann assert, the conversio refers to the ‘cognitive orientation’ 
of the mind throughout cognition, not a process of ‘turning’ from abstract to 
singular thought.56 On this interpretation, any species abstracted from a 
phantasm bears an intentional relation to the phantasm from which it was 
abstracted. According to Cory, this intentional relation arises from the relation 
                                                   
55 Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), p.287.  
56 Teresa Scarpelli Cory, ‘What is an Intellectual “Turn”? The Liber De Causis, Avicenna, and 
Aquinas’s Turn to the Phantasms’, Topicos Revista De Filosofia 45 (2013), pp.129-162; 
Elanore Stump, Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003), pp.271-273; Norman Kretzmann, 
‘Philosophy of Mind’, in Kretzmann, Norman and Stump, Eleonore (eds.) The Cambridge 
Companion to Aquinas (London: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.142.  
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of ontological dependence between the species and the phantasm. Where 
cognition is concerned, it means that when the mind grasps the species it also 
glimpses the phantasm from which it was taken. The intentional ‘mark’ left on 
the species by the phantasm draws the attention of our mind back to the sense 
representation.  
 
It is immaterial to my critique which of these positions is correct. The 
objection I will propose applies to both. However, it does seem that the latter 
position – that the conversio is a state – is the most plausible. It appears to 
have sound textual support in Aquinas57, and it fits with the apparent 
historical roots of the notion of a conversio ad phantasmata.58  
 
A critique: 
 
A number of commentators have expressed their dissatisfaction with 
Aquinas’s response.59 The main criticism is that the notion of conversio 
simply doesn’t explain how we conceptualize singular objects. The problem 
                                                   
57 See for example, Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate, 2.5 n.17 and 10.4. (XXII, p.61, 
pp.305-308).  
58 See Cory (2013), pp.135-158 for an impressive historical analysis of the notion of an 
intellectual ‘turn’.  
59 See Peter King, ‘Thinking About Things’, in Gyula Klima ed., Intentionality, Cognition and 
Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy (New York: Fordam University Press, 
forthcoming), p.7; Richard Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition (London: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), p.48; Calvin Normore, ‘The Invention of Singular Thought’, in Henrik 
Lagerlund (ed.) Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body 
Problem from Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), p.116.  
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that needs to be addressed is the conflict between a ‘formal reception’ account 
of cognition and the idea that we can know objects that are not strictly 
speaking ‘forms’ (see 4.1). Aquinas seems to merely assert an answer rather 
than offer an explanation. There is nothing in the notion of conversio that 
reconciles the tension at hand. Conceptualization involves the reception of the 
form in the mind, and nothing like this is occurring in the conversio.  
 
This issue seems relatively obvious, and it is difficult to imagine that Aquinas 
was unaware of it. Perhaps what Aquinas intended to argue with the notion of 
conversio is that the mind and the inner sensorium operate in tandem, 
allowing us to consider at once a sense experience and relevant conceptual 
content. Eleonore Stump puts forward this sort of interpretation when she 
writes:  
“For Aquinas, cognition is a systems feature; it is to be ascribed to the 
whole human being, and not to one of her components, not even to the 
fanciest component, the intellect.”60 
The claim is that though the intellect per se is incapable of accessing sense 
data, the whole human being can achieve this function, because both the 
intellect and the senses inhere in the human being. We as composites of a 
rational soul and material body can consider both sense experiences and 
conceptual content at the same time.61  
                                                   
60 Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003), p.273.  
61 Cf. Stump, 2003, p.269: “Insofar as we think perceiving as to be requisite for perception, 
our notion of perception is equivalent to Aquinas’s sensory cognition plus the first operation 
of the intellect. The senses and the phantasia together enable Hannah to get sensory data 
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However, there still seems to be an issue with the account. On Stump’s 
interpretation, Aquinas denied that we conceptualize singular objects qua 
singulars.  We rather consider the non-conceptual sense data together with 
our universal concepts, and in doing so form a unified picture of reality. If 
indeed this is what Aquinas believed, then I can’t see how this argument gets 
him to the conclusion that he drew. With his account of singular cognition, 
Aquinas wanted to explain how we can acquire a concept of singular objects 
like ‘Socrates’. Importantly, we are not talking about a mere awareness of the 
singular object, but rather a conceptual grasp of it. I can see how a phantasm 
would provide you with awareness of singular objects, but I think there is a 
significant philosophical difference between this position and holding that the 
intellect can have a conceptual grasp of singulars. It is, I take it, the distinction 
known in contemporary philosophy of perception as ‘simple seeing’ vs. ‘seeing 
as’.62 I don’t think a phantasm will give us the former. But this is precisely 
what we are after – a concept of Socrates which can enter into the judgment 
‘Socrates is a man’.  
 
A nuanced account might take sensory awareness to have proto-conceptual 
content. The phantasm does not contain universal concepts, but perhaps it 
                                                                                                                                                 
about the cat. But she does not get the concept cat from that data until the first operation of 
the intellect is completed.”  
62 ‘Simple seeing’ refers to a non-epistemic, non-conceptually structured vision. It is the ‘raw 
material’ of perception. ‘Seeing as’ refers to conceptually structured experiences in which we 
perceive categorized objects. See Fred Dretske, Perception, Knowledge and Belief: Selected 
Essays (London: Cambridge, 1996) ch.6, pp.97-112.  
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contains mental content about the accidental features of an object. This would 
seem to sit well with Aquinas’s claim that phantasms are “more spiritual” than 
lower senses, but nevertheless distinct from the intellectual concepts.63 Where 
Aquinas writes “We apprehend the individual through the senses and the 
imagination”,64 we could take the word ‘apprehend’ to be referring to a kind of 
non-universal conceptualization.  
 
But even this interpretation seems problematic. To categorize as black, 
straight, pointy etc. requires universal concepts (blackness, straightness, 
sharpness). For a phantasm to contain this sort of information, the senses 
would have to have an analogous conceptual capacity to the intellect. Aquinas 
could argue that the senses just do have this capacity. But then there is no 
analogous story of ‘formal reception’ that we can give to the senses. Aquinas 
has to either significantly modify his ‘formal reception’ account of cognition, 
or otherwise deny that we have singular knowledge. Assumedly he would 
adopt the former rather than the latter approach – but even this would require 
the development of a philosophy very different from what he expounds 
elsewhere. This, I contend, is the major issue with his notion of the cogitative 
sense, to be discussed in the next section.  
 
The notion of conversio, then, doesn’t seem adequate to solve the problem at 
hand. In fact, as I have argued, it is a notion quite underdeveloped in Aquinas. 
                                                   
63 Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate 19.1, n.240-264 (XXII, p.565); Cf. Summa Theologiae 
I 55.2 ad 2. (V, pp.55-56).  
64 Summa Theologiae I 84.7 (V, p.325): “Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et 
imaginationem.” 
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In what follows I will discuss Aquinas’s attempt to expound a further 
mechanism for singular cognition, the so-called ‘cogitative power’.  
 
4.2: Knowledge obtained by the cogitative power:  
 
In addition to the notion of the conversio, Aquinas argued that we could 
obtain knowledge of singulars via the most noble of the sense faculties, the 
cogitative power. Aquinas was aware of the problem identified in the previous 
section – there is a need to attribute some sort of conceptual capacity to the 
senses. In this section I will briefly discuss this particular faculty, and suggest 
why it too fails to provide an adequate response to the problem of the 
knowledge of singulars.   
 
Aquinas, following upon Avicenna, suggested that we have a sense faculty that 
possesses certain intellectual abilities. Aquinas most commonly referred to 
this faculty as the ‘cogitative power’ (Occasionally he uses Avicenna’s term ‘the 
estimative power’, and the term ‘particular reason’).65 The primary function of 
the cogitative power is to direct us toward what is good and away from what is 
harmful. To do this, it has to perform a variety of subordinate functions. One 
of these is apprehending the common natures of particular objects (drawing 
up the storehouse of common natures known by the intellect). Thus Aquinas 
writes:  
“[The cogitative faculty] apprehends the individual thing as existing in 
a common nature. It is able to do this because it is united to intellect in 
                                                   
65 For the latter two terms see Summa Theologiae I 78.4 and Sententia Libri De Anima, 2.13. 
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one and the same subject. Hence it is aware of a man as this man, and 
of a tree as this tree”.66  
The cogitative power can also compare and contrast different individuals:  
“[the cogitative power] is also called the ‘particular reason’ because it 
correlates individualised notions, just as the ‘universal reason’ 
correlates universal ideas.”67 
The power is even capable of syllogistic reasoning about particular objects:  
“Since, however, [the operation of reasoning] may be one of 
deliberation either about universal notions, which belongs to the 
intellectual faculty, or about particular matters, which belongs to the 
sensitive part, hence it is that “to think” is taken secondly for an act of 
the deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the cogitative 
power.”68  
                                                   
66 Sententia Libri De Anima, 2.13, n.206-210 (XLV, p.122): “Nam cogitativa apprehendit 
individuum, ut existens sub natura communi; quod contingit ei, inquantum unitur 
intellectivae in eodem subiecto; unde cognoscit hunc hominem prout est hic homo, et hoc 
lignum prout est hoc lignum.” 
67 Sententia Libri De Anima, 2.12, n.195-197 (XLV, p.121): “[vis cogitativa] dicitur etiam ratio 
particularis, eo quod est collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio universalis est 
collativa rationum universalium.” Cf. Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate, 10.5 ad.4.  
68 Summa Theologiae II-II, q.2, art.1, co. (VIII, p.26): “Sed quia talis motus potest esse vel 
animi deliberantis circa intentiones universales, quod pertinet ad intellectivam partem; vel 
circa intentiones particulares, quod pertinet ad partem sensitivam, ideo cogitare secundo 
modo sumitur pro actu intellectus deliberantis; tertio modo, pro actu virtutis cogitativae.” 
(My translation).  
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The cogitative power, then, shares in certain functions of the intellect. 
According to Aquinas, it can grasp common natures, compare and contrast 
individuals, and reason about particular matters.  
 
Pasnau and De Haan interpret the cogitative power to be the relevant bridge 
between the intellect and particular sense objects. On their account, the 
cogitative power supplies intentions (intentiones) of particular objects to the 
intellect. This allows the intellect to make judgements concerning particular 
objects, and subsequently reason about them. Thus, in a paper concerned 
specifically with linguistic apprehension, De Haan writes:   
“Semantics is not a matter which is exclusive to the intellect…the cogitative 
plays an essential role in forming meaningful singular propositions.”69 
Pasnau asserts that,  
“Without the cogitative power, there would be no particular judgments to 
reflect on. Thus the cogitative power plays a crucial role in human reasoning, 
especially practical reasoning.”70 
 
Aquinas’s notion of the cogitative power certainly has more explanatory power 
than his passing allusions to the coversio ad phantasmata. Aquinas asserts 
that the higher senses can, to a limited extent, participate in intellectual 
activity. The cogitative power, writes Aquinas, synthesizes data from the 
senses into a unified experience. It allows us to perceive in all the flurry of 
                                                   
69 Daniel De Haan, “Linguistic apprehension as incidental sensation in Thomas Aquinas”, in 
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol.84 (2011), p.188.  
70 Robert Pasnau, Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature (London: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), p.256.  
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stimuli some individual object in the external world. In this way Aquinas is 
giving us one possible answer to the question at hand – he describes at some 
length a mechanism whose raison d’etre is to allow for singular cognition.  
The notion of the conversio, in contrast, is merely an allusion to what needs to 
take place to secure singular knowledge, rather than an explanation of how it 
takes place. The notion of a cogitative power can be used as a response to 
Peter King’s criticism that “even with the best will in the world, the partisans 
of Aquinas’s “indirect” knowledge cannot say that [Aquinas’s] vague 
references to mental functions count as specifying a mechanism by which 
singular thought takes place — at best it is no more than a suggestion about 
where an answer might be found, not an answer itself.”71 
 
But while Aquinas’ theory of the cogitative power constitutes a more detailed 
response, it comes at a significant price. The notion of the cogitative power 
conflicts, in a similar manner to the conversio, with Aquinas’s broader 
account of the mind. The cogitative power, after all, is really just the inverse of 
what is proposed with the conversio – instead of imputing knowledge of 
singulars to the intellect, Aquinas is attributing knowledge of universals to the 
senses. Like the conversio, it undermines Aquinas’s ‘formal reception’ account 
of the knowledge of natures. If a sense faculty can cognize common natures, 
than it seems that abstraction of the form of an object is unnecessary for this 
operation to occur. Sense faculties, recall, are incapable of abstracting forms 
                                                   
71 Peter King, “Thinking About Things”, in Gyula Klima ed., Intentionality, Cognition and 
Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy (New York: Fordam University Press, 
forthcoming), p.7.  
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from their spatio-temporal context.72 One might say, with Dorothea Frede, 
that the vis cogitativa is “something of an embarrassment for it seems to be 
an ability that is somehow in between sense-perception and thought”.73  
 
A rejoinder to this criticism is to argue, in a similar way to how Stump defends 
the conversio, that the cogitative sense is united to the intellect by virtue of 
inhering in one and the same individual (the human person). Aquinas states 
as much in his Commentary on De Anima: “[The cogitative power] 
apprehends the individual thing as existing in a common nature, and this 
because it is united to intellect in one and the same subject.”74 According to 
this account, it is the intellect that is supplying the conceptual overlay of 
perception. Therefore, if Stump is correct, the intellect and cogitative sense 
are active in one and the same act.75  
 
This seems plausible, and if it were Aquinas’s explanation, we would have our 
desired answer. On this story, we have a genuine account of conceptualization 
of singulars, not just the fusing of universal concepts with pre-conceptual 
sensation of particulars. Ultimately, however, I don’t think that is what 
                                                   
72 Sententia Libri De Anima 2.12, n.70-94 (XLV, p.115). 
73 Dorothea Frede, ‘Aquinas on Phantasia’, in Dominic Perler (ed.) Ancient and Medieval 
Theories of Intentionality (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p.170.  
74 Sententia Libri De Anima 2.13, n.206-209 (XLV, p.122): “Nam cogitativa apprehendit 
individuum, ut existens sub natura communi; quod contingit ei, inquantum unitur 
intellectivae in eodem subiecto.”  
75 Cf. Paul A. MacDonald, Knowledge and the Transcendent: An Enquiry into the Mind’s 
relationship to God (Washington DC: CUA Press, 2009), p.131.  
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Aquinas wants to claim. I contend that Aquinas wants to say that the 
cogitative sense is itself responsible for the conceptualizing act. As he states in 
the preceding passages of De Anima,  
“What is not perceived by any special sense is known by the intellect, if 
it be a universal…But if this apprehension is of something individual, 
as when, seeing this particular coloured thing, I perceive this 
particular man or beast, then the cogitative faculty (in the case of man 
at least) is at work”.76  
Thus the cogitative sense, or the “particular reason” as it sometimes called, is 
responsible for the conceptualization of singular objects.77  
 
The cogitative sense, ultimately, has roots in the Neo-Platonist commentators 
Avicenna and Averroes. And it appears that Aquinas is drawing upon the neo-
platonic account of participation when trying to justify how the cogitative 
sense is capable of conceptualisation. It “has some share in the life of the 
intellect”.78 The notion of Aquinas’s cogitative power participating in the 
realm of rationality is precisely what Avicenna had expounded with his own 
idea of the estimative power. Avicenna posited a power that could compare, 
                                                   
76 Sententia Libri De Anima 2.13, n.182-183, 191-194 (XLV, p.121): “Quod ergo sensu proprio 
non cognoscitur, si sit aliquid universale, apprehenditur intellectu… Si vero apprehendatur in 
singulari, utputa cum video coloratum, percipio hunc hominem vel hoc animal, huiusmodi 
quidem apprehensio in homine fit per vim cogitativam”.  
77 Ibid., n.195.  
78 Sententia Libri De Anima 2.13, n.199-200 (XLV, p.122). “vis sensitiva in sui supremo 
participat aliquid de vi intellectiva in homine”.  
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contrast, and syllogize about sensible, individual objects. In this sense, he 
wrote, the estimative sense is “almost rational”.79  
 
Aquinas ultimately claimed that the cogitative power shares in some 
meaningful way in the conceptual capacities of the intellect. Unfortunately 
this Neo-Platonic line seems to undermine the strict dichotomy that Aquinas, 
following Aristotle, sets up between the senses and the intellect. This, I take it, 
is where the real tension lies – Aquinas’s attempt to synthesise a neo-Platonic 
conception of mind with an Aristotelian ‘dualist’ account. As admirable as 
Aquinas’s effort is, he doesn’t seem to succeed in this particular area. He 
doesn’t adequately reconcile the notion of “overflow”80 with his abstractionist 
theory of intellection.  
 
5. Composite concepts in Aquinas:  
 
One possible answer that Aquinas entertained was that the intellect could 
form ‘composite concepts’ and thereby apprehend individuals. We are, after 
all, capable of developing quite particular concepts through combining and 
dividing our existing concepts. We can thus go beyond a mere class of objects 
and draw closer to knowledge of a particular. To use an example provided by 
                                                   
79 Avicenna De Anima 4.3, 183. Cf. 5.5-6. See also Deborah L. Black, ‘Imagination and 
Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations’, in Topoi 19 (2000), pp.57-75.  
80 Summa Theologiae I 78.4 ad.5. The word Aquinas uses here in this passage is “refluentiam” 
– a nominalisation of the verb refluo, refluere, refluxi, ‘to overflow’.  
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Aquinas, we can combine the concepts of man, white and musical to draw 
closer some individual with those characteristics.81  
 
Nevertheless, as Aquinas himself observed, this is inadequate to latch on to 
the singular in itself. Aquinas states,  
“It is clear that, no matter how closely universals may be united, a 
complete singular never results from their union: just as if I say man, 
white, musical, and will have added whatever others are possible, a 
singular will never result from them; since it is possible for all these 
universals, which are joined together, to belong to many men.”82 
Combining concepts will not secure a knowledge of singular objects. We will 
always be left with a composite concept applicable to more than one 
individual.  
 
Conclusion:  
 
In this chapter I have considered Aquinas’s cognitive psychology, focusing 
specifically on how he explained our knowledge of particular objects. I argued 
that his account of singular cognition is inadequate. After describing 
Aquinas’s two theories of singular knowledge, I indicated that they both come 
into direct conflict with his metaphysics of intellection. The intellect, 
                                                   
81 Quaestiones Disputate in De Anima 20 co. (XXVI, p.263)  
82 Ibid.: “Manifestum est enim quod quantumcumque adunentur aliqua universalia, nunquam 
ex eis perficitur singulare. Sicut si dicam hominem album, musicum et quaecumque 
huiusmodi addidero, nunquam erit singulare. Possibile est enim omnia haec adunata pluribus 
convenire.”  
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according to Aquinas, is only capable of receiving abstract forms, and this 
precludes it from grasping singular objects. Despite Aquinas’s nuanced 
description of ‘indirect knowledge’, he fails to avoid contradicting his own 
metaphysics of mind. The theories of conversio ad phantasmata and 
cognition via the cogitative power both conflict with Aquinas’s description of 
cognition by abstraction. The intellect needs to receive a form abstracted from 
matter if it is to grasp it – an inner perception of phantasms or data from the 
cogitative power is insufficient for this to occur.  
 
In a 1964 essay, Sellars critiqued Aquinas for his confusion of the inner senses 
with the intellectual faculties. Arguing against the attribution of intentionality 
to sense data, Sellars wrote:  
“My thesis will be that sense is a cognitive faculty only in the sense 
that it makes knowledge possible and is an essential element in 
knowledge, and of itself it knows nothing.”  
As Sellars rightly observed:  
“acts of sense are intrinsically non-cognitive and do not present 
anything to us as being of a kind—e. g. white or triangular. . . ”.83 
I will return to this criticism in my conclusion, and examine how Scotus 
avoids it. Scotus, as we shall see, foresaw Sellars criticism, and offered a 
compelling response.   
 
Evidently Aquinas encountered significant difficulties when trying to explicate 
a theory of ‘indirect knowledge of singulars’. While Scotus or Ockham 
                                                   
83 “Being and Being Known”, n.27.  
 50 
encountered other issues, the specific difficulties that Aquinas faced were non-
problems for them. Scotus rejected Aquinas’s initial assumption, that essences 
are the proper object of the intellect. Instead, Scotus asserted, being was the 
proper object of the intellect. This dissolved the problematic dichotomy 
between the intellect, which was said to know universals alone, and the senses, 
which were said to know particulars. Scotus went on to describe, with relative 
ease, how we have a direct knowledge of singulars. Ockham adopted a similar 
position to Scotus.  
 
In the coming chapters I will examine the distinct varieties of direct realism 
proposed by Ockham and Scotus. I will argue that Scotus provided a more 
complete explanation of our ability to know particular objects. Ockham 
ultimately went to the other extreme of Aquinas – he could explain our 
primitive grasp of objects in front of us, but he couldn’t explain how we 
grasped them under a common nature.   
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CHAPTER III: Scotus’ epistemology and 
metaphysics of the individual 
 
Introduction:  
 
In the last chapter I analysed Aquinas’s account of singular cognition. I argued 
that he failed to provide a coherent account of the mechanisms involved in 
this process. The claims he makes about the metaphysics of the mind prevent 
him from developing a plausible account of singular knowledge. In the next 
two chapters I will discuss John Duns Scotus’s theory of intuitive cognition – 
the view that we are able to have an intuitive, intellectual knowledge of 
singular objects proximate to us. This theory served as an alternative account 
to Aquinas’s problematic position. Scotus argued that, rather than the senses 
being responsible for the knowledge of singulars, the mind was able to gain 
cognitive access to material singulars in the world. Granted, this process took 
place through the senses, but the ultimate cognitive act occurred in the 
intellect. It was in this way that Scotus was able to avoid Aquinas’s error of 
attributing cognitive capacities to what must of necessity be pre-cognitive 
capacities of the human person.84  
 
It is necessary to state from the very outset that this is a ‘reconstruction’, not a 
mere ‘restatement’, of Scotus’s cognitive theory. To discuss ‘Scotus’s cognitive 
theory’ in an unqualified way is to mistake it for a well-developed, totally 
                                                   
84 This was a criticism that Sellars leveled at Aquinas’s account of senses. In my conclusion I 
will develop my claim that Scotus overcomes this issue found in Aquinas’s writings.  
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unambiguous account of cognition. This is simply not the case. Scotus’s 
writings on cognition are spread sporadically throughout his work and 
sometimes key passages appear in total isolation from other relevant 
observations. Surprisingly, at no point in his works did Scotus provide an 
extended treatment of intuitive cognition, despite its significance for his 
conclusions.85,86 As a result, Scotus scholars are left with the difficult task of 
piecing together a theory from his various and, prima facie, disparate remarks.    
 
Despite the challenge involved, I will attempt this task, as I believe it possible 
to reconstruct a coherent, defensible account of intuitive cognition. 
Particularly relevant to us here, this Scotistic account of singular cognition 
avoids the inherent problems in Aquinas’s account. This is not to say that 
Scotus gives us the most developed theory of singular cognition. Rather, my 
claim is that Scotus’ account is the most promising response to the problem of 
the cognition of singulars. It is the response most deserving of further study.  
 
In this chapter I aim to provide the necessary metaphysical and 
epistemological background for a discussion of intuitive cognition. Scotus’s 
metaphysics of the individual is ultimately quite similar to Aquinas’s, but his 
cognitive psychology differs significantly. I will discuss Scotus’s conception of 
                                                   
85 Scotus’s longest sustained discussion of intuitive cognition In Question 13 of the Quodlibet 
(Wadding Edition XII, pp.308-323). Even in this passage there are many questions left 
unanswered. He does not, for example, specify whether we have intuitive cognition in our 
current life.  
86 Where not otherwise specified references will be to the Vatican edition, not the Wadding 
edition.  
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common natures, and then his theory of the principle of individuation 
(founded on his notion of the individual differentia). I will then consider his 
unique understanding of the object of the human intellect. Scotus believed 
that the proper object of the mind was ‘being’ (ens). This, we shall see, had a 
significant impact on his belief that individuals are intelligible to us.   
 
1. Scotus’ metaphysics of the individual:  
 
1.1: Common Natures and their intelligibility:  
 
Scotus’ account of ‘natures’ is quite similar to that of Aquinas. Like Aquinas, 
Scotus was impressed by Avicenna’s statement that “Equinity is just 
equinity”.87 Natures, conceived in the abstract, do not entail either singularity 
or universality. Scotus asserted that natures exist in two ways in the world. 
They can exist ‘conjoined’ to universality in the mind, or they can exist ‘joined’ 
to singularity in the world. In both cases the nature is ‘joined’ with something. 
Thus, a nature is not in itself singular or universal.88 This is essentially the 
same view as that which Aquinas expounded (see chapter II, section 1). 
Scotus differed from Aquinas concerning the principle of individuation (see 
                                                   
87 Avicenna, Metaphysics, V.1, 86va. The translation has been taken from The Metaphysics of 
the Healing, trans. Michael E. Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2005).  
88 Quaestiones Metaphysicae Subtilissimae Super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, 7.18 
(VII, p.458): “Est ergo natura in potentia remota ad determinationem singularitatis et ad 
indeterminationem uniuersalis; et sicut a producente coniungitur singularitati, ita a re agente 
et simul ab intellectu agente coniungitur uniuersalitati.” 
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1.2), but they were in agreement that natures were individualised in this 
situation and became constituents of particular objects.  
 
Aquinas and Scotus also seem to have agreed on the question of the 
‘intelligibility’ of natures existing in the external world. For Aquinas, natures 
are unintelligible when instantiated in material objects. In this state they have 
a ‘material being’ and are unable to be received by the mind.89 It is necessary 
for the agent intellect (intellectus agens) to abstract an intelligible species 
from the sense representations of the object. The species is the same kind of 
nature as the nature in the object, but in this case it has ‘intentional’ or 
‘mental’ being.90 It is a bearer of semantic content, in contrast to the non-
intelligible nature in the object.  
 
Scotus subscribed to a position quite similar to this. Natures that inform 
matter are not actually intelligible, only potentially so. The action of the agent 
intellect is required to make them actually intelligible to the mind. In the 
Ordinatio and the Reportatio, Scotus repeatedly stated that the agent intellect 
is required to make data from the external world accessible in the mental 
realm (it converts information “from order to order”, as Averroes wrote).91 In 
                                                   
89 Summa Theologica 1.79.3 ad.3: “Now the intelligible in act is not 
something existing in nature; if we consider the nature of things sensible, which do not 
subsist apart from matter.” 
90 Ibid. Cf. Sententia Libri De Anima 2.12, n.337.  
91 Averroes, Commentarium Magnum, 3.17, p.439. Page reference is to the Latin text in 
Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros, F. Stuart 
Crawford (ed.) (Cambridge: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953). 
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the Reportatio, Scotus described the process in the following way: “the agent 
intellect acts together with this sense imagination moved efficaciously by the 
image of the most efficacious object, and prepares the possible intellect to use 
the corresponding species by abstracting the intelligible species.”92 Implicit in 
these comments is the idea that natures as instantiated in the external world 
are not in that state intelligible. They need to be acted upon by the active 
intellect if they are to appear in the mental realm.  
 
There are, I concede, certain passages that suggest natures in the external 
world are already intelligible. In the Metaphysics, Scotus wrote of an 
individual that is “suited to be seen” without being converted into an 
intelligible species:  
“Further, as regards the agent intellect it can be said that it has no 
action as regards the understanding; and therefore with no object 
does it co-act in intellectual vision [intuition], which is immediately in 
the intellective [power], not by means of a species in memory. For 
then it would not be vision…neither does a nature which is suited to be 
seen and exist actually in reality require in us [an agent intellect].”93   
                                                   
92 Reportatio Parisiensia 1-A.3.4: “huic autem phantasiae efficaciter motae per phantasma 
obiecti efficacissimi coagit intellectus agens et immutat intellectum possibilem ad usum 
speciei correspondentis abstrahendo speciem intelligibilem” (Merton 59, 35v-37v). Cf. 
Ordinatio I 3.6 (IX, 243). 
93 Quaestiones Metaphysicae, 7.15.30. (VII, pp.438-439): “Ulterius de intellectu agente potest 
dici, quod non habet actionem circa intelligentiam; et ideo nulli objecto coagit in intellectione 
visiva, quae est immediate in intellectiva, non mediante specie in memoria. Tunc enim non 
esset visio…nec in nobis natura, quae nata est videri, et est actu in re, ut natura.” Cf. Ordinatio 
I 3.7 (III, pp.296-297).  
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The nature, as Scotus wrote, is already in such a state that it can be perceived 
by the mind – there is no need for a species to render it cognizable. Further, as 
Richard Cross has noted, there are passages in the Ordinatio that state that an 
intelligible object can be present to the intellect despite not informing (i.e. 
inhering subjectively in) the intellect.94 These passages imply that intelligible 
objects exist in the external world, not just in the mind.   
 
Although these passages are interesting, I do not think that it is not quite 
accurate to say they describe a kind of ‘semantic externalism’.95 In the 
Metaphysics text, it seems that Scotus was responding to a particular question 
– namely, whether or not intuitive cognition requires an intelligible species. I 
do not think that Scotus was trying to rule out the role of the agent intellect 
altogether. The agent intellect can still be said to co-act in a certain way with 
the external object, even if it is not for the sake of producing an intelligible 
species. It seems rather that, for Scotus, the agent intellect was a co-cause of 
the direct, unmediated cognition that occurs in cases of intellectual 
                                                   
94 See Richard Cross, “Some Varieties of Semantic Externalism in Duns Scotus’s Cognitive 
Psychology”, Vivarium 46 (2009), pp.275-301. For the relevant passage in Scotus, see Ord. 
1.3.3.2, nn. 500-501 (III, pp.296-297). 
95 By the term ‘semantic externalism’, I am simply referring to the idea that objects in the 
external world are already intelligible, and don’t require the action of the agent intellect to 
make them accessible to the human mind. See Cross 2009 for a more detailed explanation of 
this notion.  
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intuition.96 Scotus stated in the fourth book of the Ordinatio, arguably his 
most mature97 writing on the topic:  
“The sufficient causes of [intuitive cognition] are the object present in 
its actual existence and the agent and possible intellects, all of which 
can work together (concurrere)”.98  
Furthermore, in the Ordinatio passage that Cross refers to, Scotus stated that 
intuitive cognition involves both the intellect and the object:  
“These two partial causes [i.e. the object and the agent intellect], close 
to each other without the informing of the one by the other, cause one 
common effect by their required proximity alone.”99  
Whilst Scotus often emphasized the direct causal role played by objects in 
intuitive cognition, I do not think that this should imply that he was a 
supporter of semantic externalism. Instead, Scotus is merely trying to 
                                                   
96 I will refrain from giving a protracted definition of intuitive cognition here, as I will provide 
one in the next chapter. For now, it shall suffice to refer back to the definition offered in 
footnote 16. 
97 Wolter dates the fourth book of the Ordinatio somewhere between 1304-1308. See Allan 
Wolter, ‘Intuition, Memory and Knowledge of Individuals’, in Marylin McCord Adams (ed.) 
The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990) 
p.103.  
98 sed istae duae causae partiales approximatae, absque informatione alterius 
ab altera, per solam approximationem debitam causant unum eff ectum communem. 
Ordinatio, 1.3.3.2, n.500-1 (XIX, pp.157-8).. 
99 Cross, 2009, p.276.  
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emphasize the difference between intuitive cognition and abstractive 
cognition, the latter having an intelligible species as its direct cause.100  
 
1.2: Scotus on ‘individual differentia’:  
 
Scotus is well known for his rejection of the idea that matter is the principle of 
individuation. The reasons for this rejection are varied and complex, and it 
would go beyond the scope of this thesis to describe them in detail. Suffice to 
say that Scotus goes through various possibilities (quantity, existence, matter, 
and any aspect of the agent itself) and rules them out as possible principles of 
individuation.101 The alterative principle that Scotus proposed was what he 
sometimes called ‘thisness’ (haecceitas) or the individual differentia 
(differentia individualis).102  
 
Human beings are unable to cognize individual differentia in this life (see 
section 2). Hence, when trying to define them we need to be content with a 
kind of functional definition. The individual differentia is that which gives 
                                                   
100 “actus abstractivus et intuitivus differunt specie, quia aliud et aliud est ibi movens ; hic 
enim movet species similis rei ; ibi autem movet res praesens in se.”  (“An abstractive and an 
intuitive act differ in kind, because there is a different thing producing the movement in each 
case. In the first, a species that is similar to the object produces the movement; in the second, 
the object present in its own right produces the movement.”) (Ordinatio 4.49.12 (XXI, p.442)).  
101 Quaestiones Metaphysicae, 7.13.1-19 (VII, pp.402-404).  
102 Peter King observes that Scotus uses a number of different terms to describe this 
individuating principle. I have mentioned two. Others include ‘individual form’, ‘singular 
differentia’ and ‘individual degree of unity’. See Peter King, ‘Duns Scotus on Singular 
Essences’, in Medioevo 30 (2005), pp.111-137. 
 60 
individuality to a common nature. It fixes the nature to a specific individual 
and makes it a “this”. Whereas Aquinas argues that matter individuates 
specific forms, Scotus claims that the ‘individual differentia’ performs this 
role.103 
 
Importantly, the individual differentia does not create new species but rather 
differentiates individuals. It is not opposed to the idea of a unified nature of 
humanity.  As Peter King observes,  
“individuals, while falling under the same species, are nevertheless 
distinct. The metaphysical diversity that separates one individual 
differentia from another does not carry over into diversity of what 
each produces when combined with a given common nature.”104  
 
What the individual differentia does do is produce a singular essence, 
additional to the specific essence. When Scotus referred to the ‘specific 
essence’, he was describing the common nature of entities (for example, 
rational animal in the case of human beings). When he used the term 
‘singular essence’ he was referring to the integrated whole that is the common 
nature plus its individuating differentia. Together these form a singular 
essence, above and beyond the specific essence.  
 
1.3: Formalities and the formal distinction:  
 
                                                   
103 Quaestiones Metaphysicae, 7.13.109 (VII, p.416).  
104 King, 2005, p.123.   
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In this section I aim only to provide a brief explanation of formalities and the 
formal distinction. I will focus on the details strictly relevant to this thesis. 
Suffice to say that is much more to the formal distinction than stated here.105   
 
The formal distinction is a conceptual distinction made by the mind about 
individual objects. When we make a formal distinction we isolate conceptually 
one aspect of the intelligible content of an object. The mind apprehends one 
metaphysical component of the object on its own. Some examples are 
apprehending the “animality” of a particular human being, or alternatively her 
“rationality”. Scotus also applied the formal distinction to the attributes of 
God, though in this case the distinction between the attributes is far weaker 
than the metaphysical composition of creatures.  
 
A formal distinction is different from what the Scholastics called a ‘distinction 
of reason’ (distinctio rationis). A distinction of reason has no actual 
foundation in the reality of a thing itself, whereas a formal distinction is 
grounded in the metaphysical composition of the substance. There is also a 
difference between the formal distinction and a ‘real distinction’ (distinctio 
realis). A real distinction is one that exists entirely independent of the mind. A 
trivial example would be the distinction between two separate individuals. 
This exists completely independently of any conceptualisation. A formal 
distinction, in contrast, while having some basis in reality, needs to be 
                                                   
105 For a detailed discussion of the formal distinction see Allan B. Wolter, The Philosophical 
Theology of John Duns Scotus (Ithaca: Cornell, 1990), ch.4, and Peter King, ‘Scotus on 
Metaphysics’ in Thomas Williams (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.21-26.  
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discovered by the mind. For example, the faculties of the will and the intellect 
are both identical with the soul, despite being distinct powers. It is necessary 
for our mind to make a conceptual distinction between the two if they are to 
be considered in isolation from each other. When we do this, we can speak 
validly of two distinct powers, despite their ontological identity in reality. In 
this example we see how formal distinctions have some grounding in reality, 
and yet also require a mind to “draw them out”.106  
 
Scotus called the objective correlate of the formal distinction a ‘formality’. A 
formality is the metaphysical aspect of the object itself that constitutes the 
basis for the distinction made by the mind. Examples of these objective 
formalities include body and soul, animality and rationality, specific essence 
and haecceity, and so forth. Whilst these formalities constitute a unity with all 
the other aspects of the entity, they nevertheless do not dissolve into an 
amorphous whole – they are capable of being grasped alone by the intellect.  
 
In some cases the mind is able to grasp an object under some formalities and 
not others. The intellect can grasp an individual object under the aspect of its 
specific essence, as will be discussed, but not under the aspect of its particular 
essence. I will return to this subtle distinction when explaining intuitive 
cognition in the next chapter.  
 
2. The cognitive capacities of human beings: 
 
                                                   
106 Cf. King, 2006, p.23.  
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2.1: Being as the object of the human intellect: 
 
As outlined in Chapter II of this thesis, Aquinas argued that the object of the 
human intellect is the essence of any concrete material thing. Scotus dissented 
from this view, stating in the very first question of the Ordinatio that “the 
prime natural object of our intellect must be being insofar as it is being”.107 
There were a number of reasons why Scotus held this position, but most seem 
reducible to his fundamental conviction that we can grasp all things in se, and 
not accidentally through some other entity. Insofar as this is true, Scotus 
reasoned, the object of the intellect must be some essential characteristic of all 
per se intelligibles. The only common characteristic in all things is being, and 
hence this must be the proper object of the intellect.108 
 
It is on these grounds that Scotus critiques Aquinas’s position. If, as Aquinas 
believed, the proper object of the intellect is the form in material things, then 
we would be unable to grasp ‘being’ in its generality. By definition the mind 
would be confined to a particular kind of being – namely, material things – 
and this would render metaphysics impossible.109 Metaphysics is the study of 
                                                   
107 Ordinatio, prologue, 1, n.1: “primum objectum intellectus nostri naturale, est ens 
inquantum ens”. (VIII, p.9).  
108 Quaestiones Metaphysicae, 6.3.20 (VII, p.336).  
109 Thus Scotus writes: “No power is able to grasp an object under some formality more 
general than the formality of its prime object – this is obvious, for then things [powers] would 
not be adapted to the essence of their first object”. Insofar as the object of the mind is the 
essence of material things, it is unable to grasp being in its generality (ens qua ens). See 
Ordinatio, I.3.3, no.117: “nulla potentia potest cognoscere obiectum aliquod sub ratione 
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being qua being, according to Aristotle,110 and is not focused on particular 
kinds of beings.111 Scotus used similar reasoning when critiquing the view that 
truth is the proper object of the intellect. If the object of the intellect were 
something like truth, the other transcendental aspects of being (unity, 
goodness and beauty) could only be accessed in a derivative manner (per 
accidens), through the particular instances of truth that concern them 
(particular instances concerning ‘the good’, ‘the one’ and ‘the beautiful’).112 
This was for Scotus an unacceptable conclusion. It is necessary to posit being 
as the proper object of the intellect, as this is the only category under which 
every aspect of reality can be grasped in itself (in se).  
 
2.2: The ability of the human intellect to know individual objects:  
 
Scotus’ position on the object of the human intellect implies that the mind is 
theoretically capable of grasping individual objects. Individuals as well as 
universals fall under the fundamental category of ‘being’. There is no obstacle 
to individuals being grasped in their individuality. For Aquinas the materiality 
of singulars meant that they were unintelligible to the human mind. For 
                                                                                                                                                 
communiore quam sit ratio sui primi obiecti, - quod patet primo per rationem, quia tunc illa 
ratio primi obiecti non esset adaequata” (III, p.72).  
110 Aristotle, Metaphysics IV.1 (1003a21): “[Metaphysics is] a science that studies being in so 
far as it is being”. The reason why I am mentioning Aristotle’s definition of metaphysics, and 
not another Ancient philosopher, is because Scotus himself develops a critique of Aquinas 
based on this definition.   
111 Ordinatio, I 3.3 (IX, p.87). Cf. Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy Volume II: 
Augustine to Scotus (Tunbridge Wells: Burns and Oates, 1999), p.489.  
112 Quaestiones Metaphysicae, 6.3.18-20 (VII, pp.335-336).  
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Scotus, the materiality of singulars made no difference. They were still beings 
and thus in principle intelligible.113  
 
This aspect of Scotus’ writings – concerning the theoretical capacities of the 
human intellect – is quite detailed and contains interesting insights about the 
cognitive life of the beatified in Heaven. These theological concerns, however, 
fall beyond the scope of this thesis. We are here concerned with our ability in 
this life to know particular objects.114 
 
After his significant treatment of the theoretical capacities of the human 
intellect, Scotus concludes that we are incapable of knowing the singular 
essence of objects in statu isto.115 In our current state, we can only grasp the 
common nature and accidents of an object. The mind cannot access the 
individuating feature of a particular entity. Scotus appeals to our 
phenomenological experience of objects to justify his conclusion:  
“the most distinct intellection of the singular seems to be of some 
intention that the intellect knows distinctly; but positing such 
precisely, and prescinding from all time differences and the various 
                                                   
113 Reportatio I-A 35.1.1: “Ergo ens materiale in quantum materiale est ens per se intelligibile 
quantum est ex se et per se cognoscibile.” (XXII, p.418). Cf. Metaphysics 7.14.8 (VII, p.430).  
114 I direct the reader to the following primary and secondary literature on the topic if they 
wish to know more about Scotus on the beatific vision: For Scotus’ writing on the question see 
Metaphysics 7.14 and 7.15. For relevant secondary literature, see King, 2005, pp.132-136, and 
Robert Pasnau, “Abstract Truth in Thomas Aquinas”, in Henrik Lagerlund ed., 
Representation and Objects of Thought in Medieval Philosophy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 
p.33-39.  
115 Quaestiones Metaphysicae, 7.15.19 (VII, p.437).  
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degrees of intensity as well as all other accidents [‘befalling’] such an 
intention, it does not seem that our intellect knows how to distinguish 
or differentiate this intention from the intention of any other singular 
of the same species that may be shown to it”.116  
If we did know singular essences we would be able to distinguish these two 
objects. We cannot, and so it seems that this singular essence is unintelligible 
to us. We can know the various accidents, but not this unique and 
unrepeatable feature of the object. 
 
Scotus, like Aquinas before him, developed a theory of composite concepts 
whereby we can draw closer to a full understanding of individuals. We can 
grasp data about the accidents of an individual, in addition to its specific 
essence, and with this we are able to formulate a description of the particular 
entity.117 We can add concepts of the object as something that is mind-
independent. The terms Scotus uses as examples are “existence here and now”, 
“one in number” and “incommunicable”.118 
 
Whilst we can develop quite sophisticated composite concepts, Scotus 
asserted that such concepts would remain to some degree imprecise. Our 
                                                   
116 Quaestiones Metaphysicae, 7.15.20: “distinctissima intellectio singularis videtur esse 
alicuius intentionis, quam intellectus distincte cognoscit; sed posita illa praecise, amota 
differentia temporis, amoto alio et alio gradu intentionis, et sic de omnibus accidentibus illi 
intentioni non videtur quod intellectus noster sciat distinguere vel discernere, si ostendatur 
sibi a quacumque alia intentione singulari eiusdem speciei” (VII, p.437).  
117 Ibid., 7.15.32. (VII, p.439).  
118 Ibid., 7.13.166. (VII, p.424). Cf. 7.15.32: “individuum, unum numero, incommunicabile”. 
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concept will always be applicable to individuals who, though sharing both the 
same specific essence and all accidental features, have distinct ‘individual 
differentia’. Hence the conclusion Scotus drew that we are incapable of 
grasping singulars per se distinct from all other existing entities.119  
 
Conclusion: 
  
Aquinas and Scotus were working within a similar metaphysical system when 
expounding their theories of cognition. As has been outlined in this chapter,  
they both described individuals as composites of a nature and an 
individuating feature (for Aquinas, the individuating feature was matter, for 
Scotus it was the individual differentia). They both held that this individuating 
feature was unintelligible to us in this life. Furthermore, they both expounded 
a theory of ‘abstractionism’ whereby the agent intellect extracts universal 
content from representations in the senses. These similarities have led some 
to see Scotus as simply developing a similar account of cognition to 
Aquinas.120  
 
                                                   
119 Ibid., 7, 15.32. Scotus writes, “…nam ad nihil devenimus, cui de ratione sua inquantum a 
nobis cognoscitur, contradictorie repugnant alteri inesse, et sine tali conceptu numquam 
conciptur singular disctincte.” (“We do not arrive at anything in which, according to the 
content of the concept known by us, there is something contradictorily opposed to being in 
another. And without such a concept we never conceive the singular distinctly”) 
120 See, for example, Robert Pasnau, ‘Cognition’, in Thomas Williams (ed.) The Cambridge 
Companion to Duns Scotus (London: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.285.  
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There is a crucial difference, however, between the two in their understanding 
of the proper object of the human intellect. For Aquinas, the proper object was 
universals, whereas for Scotus it was being. This allowed Scotus to develop a 
theory of cognition whereby we apprehend individual objects directly. 
Aquinas could not make the same claim. His belief about the proper object of 
the mind proved very problematic for his cognitive psychology (see the 
critique presented in chapter II).  
 
Scotus stated that the individual essence of objects is unintelligible to humans 
in this life. He nevertheless believed that we could grasp the individual in 
another sense. In the following chapter I will describe this notion of Scotus’s 
and show how his unique position on the object of the intellect influenced his 
response to the problem of the knowledge of singulars.  
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CHAPTER IV: Intuitive Cognition 
 
Introduction:  
 
While Scotus and Aquinas agreed on certain questions in cognitive psychology, 
they differed greatly in how they answered the question of singular cognition. 
As explained in Chapter II, Aquinas held that we have indirect knowledge of 
singulars through intellectual reflection on sense representations. Scotus, on 
the other hand, argued that we have a direct grasp of singulars through a 
novel kind of simple apprehension – ‘intuitive cognition’. In intuitive 
cognition the mind is able to apprehend singulars in themselves. According to 
Scotus, this process relies on the senses but does not use the senses as a 
cognitive intermediary. The mind thus has a genuine (and direct) intellectual 
grasp of singular objects.  
 
In this chapter I intend to lay the foundation for my claim that Scotus 
proposed a more coherent account of singular cognition than the theory that 
was proposed by Aquinas. In the concluding chapter I will argue that Scotus, 
in contrast to Aquinas, manages to avoid the danger posed by Sellars’ ‘Myth of 
the Given’ objection. To this end I will here discuss Scotus’ theory of intuitive 
cognition, addressing a number of key interpretive dilemmas along the way. I 
will examine the motivations behind Scotus’s theory, the mechanisms that he 
believed to underpin the process, and the responses that he proposed to 
certain anticipated objections.    
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As I emphasised at the beginning of the previous chapter, we are working with 
a collection of sporadic remarks about intuitive cognition. Unlike Ockham, 
who discussed the topic confidently and at length, Scotus tends to treat the 
topic hesitantly and in a piecemeal fashion.121 Despite this approach, as I will 
show below, I believe we have sufficient evidence to achieve some degree of 
certainty about what Scotus intended. A number of statements he made in his 
later works provide us with explicit answers to key exegetical questions.  
 
A brief note on dating:  
 
Unlike in the works of Aquinas, in Scotus’s writings there is an identifiable 
change in opinion on the question of intuitive cognition of singular objects. In 
his earliest writings Scotus treats intuitive cognition as a mere theoretical 
possibility, whereas in his later work it plays an indispensible role in everyday 
cognition. I will only focus on Scotus’s mature thought on intuitive cognition, 
and as a result I will pay closest attention to those works written towards the 
end of his career. According to Allan Wolter, the two main works that reflect 
Scotus’s later thought are his Quodlibet and his Ordinatio book IV: “Hence 
the questions in distinction 45 of this book we rank with questions six and 
thirteen of the Quodlibet as the most mature expressions of his thought on 
intuitive cognition”. 122 Where I make reference to Scotus’s earlier works I will 
                                                   
121 Cf. Calvin Normore, ‘The Invention of Singular Thought’, in Henrik Lagerlund (ed.) 
Forming the Mind: Essays on the Internal Senses and the Mind/Body Problem from 
Avicenna to the Medical Enlightenment (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), pp.109-128. 
122 Allan B. Wolter, OFM, The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scouts (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), p.103. Cf. A.G. Little, ‘Chronological Notes on the Life of Duns Scotus’, 
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only use passages that are consonant with the ideas expressed in Scotus’s later 
works. Some argue that Scotus, in his earlier works, explicitly denied the 
possibility of intuitive cognition in this life.123 I do not think there is sufficient 
textual evidence for this claim, but he certainly had a degree of doubt about 
the possible coherence of such a project.124 These doubts had obviously 
disappeared by the time Scotus wrote book IV of the Ordinatio. In that text he 
states explicitly that we have intuitive cognition in this life as well as the 
next.125  
 
1. The motivation for the theory:  
 
Scotus made a number of observations about human cognition in general that 
he believed demonstrated the existence of intuitive cognition in particular. I 
believe his most convincing argument is that which is based on our ability to 
verify contingent judgements about the world. Scotus argues that if we do 
indeed make accurate contingent judgements – such as ‘Socrates is running’ – 
then we must be able to grasp singulars qua existent and present.   
                                                                                                                                                 
English historical Review 47 (1932), p.573, and C.K. Brampton, ‘Duns Scotus at Oxford, 
1288-1301’, Franciscan Studies 24 (1964), pp.9-10.   
123 Robert Pasnau, ‘Cognition’, in Thomas Williams (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Duns 
Scotus (London: Cambridge, 2003), p.299; p.309 (fn.81).  
124 In his Quaestiones Metaphysicae, he limits himself to stating the arguments for both sides 
of the discussion. He doesn’t state categorically that we can have intuitive cognition in this life. 
See Quaestiones Metaphysicae 2.3.  
125 See the passages from the Ordinatio IV 45 discussed in the following section. It appears 
that Scotus already had the relevant arguments in mind when he wrote the passages of 
Ordinatio III 14.3 (XIV, 512).  
 73 
He writes,  
“From the knowledge of quiddities and universals, which is certainly 
necessary, it is not possible to know a complex contingent being. But 
the existences or non-existences of things are contingent; therefore it 
is not sufficient to have knowledge of the quiddities and universals, 
since what is known is this singular thing, for instance, it is Socrates 
who runs.”126 
He continues:  
“Moreover it is necessary to receive (with the mind) the knowledge of 
the existence of the actual thing, or its non-existence, and even the 
knowledge of its accidents, which are required for the existence or 
non-existence from things.” 127  
Scotus’s argument is thus essentially this: It is necessary that we have 
knowledge of singular objects as existing if we are to make judgements like 
‘Socrates is running’. Abstract cognition is inadequate to give us such 
knowledge. Therefore we must have some other kind of cognitive grasp of 
singular objects.128  
                                                   
126 “Ex notitia quidditatum et universalium, quae scilicet sunt necessaria, non potest cognosci 
complexio contingens. Sed existentiae rerum vel non existentiae sunt contingentes; ergo non 
sufficit habere notitiam quidditatum et universalium, ad hoc quod cognoscat hoc singulare 
esse, puta hunc Socratem currere…” Ordinatio II 3.11.11; (XII, 278), my translation. Cf. IV 
45.3.17 (XX, 348-349); Reportatio Parisiensia IV 45.2.20 (XXIV, 567).   
127 “Adhuc necessario habetur accipere notitiam existentiae actualis rei, vel non existentiae, et 
etiam accidentium notitiam, quae requiruntur ad existentiam vel non existentiam a rebus”. 
Ibid. (my translation).   
128 Pasnau argues that we only have intuitive cognition in the next life. See Robert Pasnau, 
‘Cognition’, in The Cambridge Companion to Scotus (London: Cambridge University Press, 
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Scotus provides another argument for intuitive cognition based on reflections 
on the nature of knowledge and on the kind of perception had by the senses: 
“Every perfection which is a perfection of cognition absolutely and 
which can be present in a faculty of sense knowledge can pertain 
eminently to an intellective cognitional faculty…a sense power…can 
attain an object in itself as existing and present in its real existence, 
and not just diminutively in a kind of imperfect likeness of itself. 
Therefore this perfection also pertains to an intellective power in the 
act of knowing. It could not pertain to it however unless it could know 
an existing thing and know it as present…in its own existence”129 
This text is an amended version of a slightly longer argument. Scotus argues 
that first (i.e. primitive) knowledge involves the ‘perfect attainment of an 
object’, as distinct from possessing some diminished likeness of it. Following 
this he notes that the senses – which manage to achieve a ‘sensory knowledge’ 
of things – grasp individual objects as present and existent. In a final step he 
                                                                                                                                                 
2006), p.299. His claim seems implausible once we consider the role that intuitive cognition 
was intended to fulfill. One of its key functions was to account for our ability to verify 
contingent judgments. Insofar as this is its role, then we must have it in this life. 
129 “omnis perfectio cognitionis absolute, quae potest competere potentiae cognitivae 
sensitivae, potest eminenter competere potentiae cognitivae intellectivae…sensitiva autem 
habet hanc perfectionem in cognitione sua, quia potest obiectum attingere in se, ut exsistens 
et ut praesens est in exsistentia reali, et non tantum diminute attingendo ipsum in quadam 
perfectione diminuta; ergo ista perfectio competit intellectivae in cognoscendo; sed non 
posset sibi competere, nisi cognosceret exsistens et ut in exsistentia propria praesens est” 
Quodlibet 6.19 (Wadding edition XII.1, 145). Cf. q.13.29 (Wadding edition XII.2, 309); 
Ordinatio II 3.2.2 (Vat. VII, 552-554).    
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claims that the cognitive perfections possessed by the senses are possessed in 
an analogous way by the intellect. Hence the conclusion: that the intellect is 
capable of intuitive cognition (a grasp of individual objects as present and 
existent).  
 
There are certain contentious premises in this argument, such as the claim 
that sense perfections are possessed in an analogous way by the intellect. I 
don’t, however, believe the argument hopeless. There is a sense in which our 
intellectual activity co-travels with the senses, and operates in an analogous 
way. For the sake of brevity though, I won’t try to develop it further. The first 
argument regarding contingent judgments can stand alone as a justification 
for positing intuitive cognition. It does not need this latter argument to 
support it. 
 
Scotus also provides us with a number of arguments that begin from articles 
of faith – not in themselves subject to philosophical demonstration – and end 
in philosophical conclusions. One consideration that was a strong motivation 
for the notion of intuitive cognition was the desire to explain the Catholic 
doctrine of the Beatific Vision – that we will one day behold God in an 
immediate way  (“face to face”, to use the phrase of St. Paul).130 This led 
Scotus to argue that:  
                                                   
130 “aliqua etiam potest esse obiecti existentis, ut existentis; quia talem habebit Beatus de 
obiecto beatifico alioquin posset aliquis esse beatus in obiecto, esto per impossibile, ispum 
non esset existens, de quo dictur habere claram visionem, facie ad faciem; propter hoc, quod 
actus eius cognoscendi tendit in illud, ut in se praesens in propria existential actuali.” 
Quodlibet, q.13, n.28 (Lyon XII, p.309). The translation has been taken from God and 
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“There can also be intellectual knowledge of the existent qua  existent, 
for the blessed will have such knowledge of the beatific object [God]. 
Otherwise someone could be beatified by the object even if, to assume 
the impossible, it did not exist. And yet there is admittedly a clear 
face-to-face vision of this object, since the act of knowing it tends to 
this object as present in itself with its own actual existence.” 
If you accept the articles of faith that Scotus is relying upon (that there is a 
‘next life’, that we will have a beatific vision of God) then his argument is 
plausible. His philosophical observation – that the beatific vision would 
require intuitive cognition – follows from a consideration of what the beatific 
vision necessarily involves.   
 
There is then, good justification for positing the notion of intuitive cognition. 
If you accept the relevant doctrines of Catholic theology, then intuitive 
cognition seems, at least in the next life, to be a necessity. Even if you don’t 
accept these doctrines, there is the strong argument that we need intuitive 
cognition to verify our contingent judgments about the state of world.   
 
2. The nature of intuitive cognition:  
 
Intuitive cognition was Scotus’ way of explaining how we know objects as 
existing and present. He argued that we have an intuitive (i.e. non-abstractive) 
grasp of the individual objects proximate to us. To be exact, we grasp common 
                                                                                                                                                 
Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions trans. Felix Alluntis and Allan B. Wolter (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975), pp.290-291. Cf. Quodlibet, q.6, n.20. For St. Paul’s 
expression, see 1 Corinthians, 13:12.  
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natures as instantiated in some individual existing here and now (hic et nunc). 
We grasp the individual under the aspects (or formalities) of nature, existence 
and spatiotemporal presence.  
 
There seems to me to be two aspects of intuitive cognition that require 
explanation:   
1) That we apprehend common natures as instantiated in an individual.  
2) That we apprehend the individual under the aspects of existence and 
presence. 
I will discuss these two in turn.131  
 
Through intuitive cognition we apprehend a particular token of a common 
nature. Rather than apprehending a common nature in the abstract (as is the 
case with abstractive cognition) we grasp the nature as belonging to some 
individual. We apprehend the token of the nature ‘man’ as ‘this man’.  The 
intention ‘this’, as we will see, arises from the cognitive grasp of the object as 
existing and present. The common nature is apprehended as a belonging to 
the ‘this’ (i.e. the existing and present object). This is what Scotus means when 
he writes, “intuitive cognition is not only of the singular, insofar as it is 
intuitive cognition, but essentially is of the nature of the existent, as it is 
                                                   
131 The interpretation I will present is more or less along the lines of what Sebastian Day 
(1947) and Peter King (forthcoming) argue. In contrast to Day and King, however, I place 
greater emphasis on the role of common natures in intuitive cognition. I emphasise that it is 
the common nature, rather than the haecceity, of the object that we grasp.  
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existing”.132 He makes a similar remark in the Metaphysics: “our intellect has 
some intellection which is called vision, which can be of the nature of the 
existing without the vision of singularity, as sight through the eye sees”.133 
Intuitive cognition, then, involves a grasp of the nature of an existing object, 
as it exists in concrete reality.  
 
Before we proceed, there is an important distinction that must be made 
between the two senses in which Scotus uses the term ‘singular’ (singulare). It 
will make clear just exactly what we grasp when we grasp ‘the singular’. The 
first sense of the term refers to ‘an existent being’ that instantiates a nature. 
This is a metaphysically thin sense of ‘singular’. ‘Singular’ in this sense refers 
to any existing object that instantiates a common nature (such as ‘this existing 
cat’, or ‘this existing chair’). There is nothing more to the notion than this. The 
second sense of the term is metaphysically rich. It refers to an individual 
entity qua as distinct from all other real or possible entities. ‘Singular’, in this 
sense, picks out the haecceity of an individual. The first sense of ‘singular’ 
might usefully be called generic singularity, and the second particular 
singularity.  
 
                                                   
132 “Cognitio intuitiva non est tantum singularis, inquantum est cognitio intuitiva, sed 
essentialiter est ipsius naturae existentis, ut existens est” Reportata Parisiensia IV 45.3.13 
(XXIV, 575-576) 
133 “intellectus noster habet aliquam intellectionem, quae dicitur visio, quae potest esse 
naturae existentis sine visione singularitatis, sicut visus oculi videt” Quaestiones 
Metaphysicae 7.15.6 (VII, p.438). 
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Scotus believed that we can grasp generic singularity through intuitive 
cognition, but we are unable to grasp particular singularity. The former is 
accessible to us in this life via our intuitive grasp of existing objects. The latter 
can only be grasped in the next life. The cognitive infirmities of this life 
prevent us from grasping the haecceity of an individual.134  
 
The second characteristic of intuitive cognition is that it involves a grasp of an 
object as existent and present. According to Scotus, when we have an intuitive 
cognition of an object, we apprehend the object under the formalities of 
presence and existence. He writes in the Quodlibet, “[intuitive cognition is of] 
a present object qua present and of an existing object qua existing”.135 
Similarly, in the Ordinatio, he writes, “vision is of what is existent as it is 
existent and as it is present to the seer according to its existence”.136 Whereas 
in abstractive cognition objects are experienced in a manner indifferent to 
existence, in intuitive cognition the object is present to the perceiver.  
 
It is difficult to know just what Scotus had in mind with the phenomenological 
notion of presence. In an essay on 14th century notions of cognitive presence, 
                                                   
134 This limitation of the mind was discussed in chapter IV, section 2.2.  
135 Quodlibet 6.19 (Wadding edition XII.1, 145), my italics. The translation has been taken 
from Alluntis and Wolter 1975, p.136.  
136 “Visio (i.e., cognitio intuitiva) est existentis ut existens est, et ut praesens est videnti 
secundum existentiam suam,”. (Ordinatio I, 1.2, n.3) (XIII, P.101) 
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Joël Biard argues that Scotus’s notion is modelled upon the beatific vision.137 
He writes,  
“in the beatific vision, [intuitive cognition] is possible and even 
required, and this determines a sort of model: the model of knowledge 
as a direct vision of the thing itself, without any intermediate or any 
diminution in the being or consistency of the thing thus 
understood.”138  
Scotus asserted that abstract entities inhering in the mind have a kind of 
diminished being (ens diminutum), and Biard wants to contrast this with a 
case in which the object is present to rather than present in the mind. In 
abstractive cognition, we perceive a similitude in the mind, but in intuitive 
cognition, we perceive objects themselves, in the full richness of their being. 
We perceive ‘clearly’ insofar as we cognize the object in its fullness.    
 
I believe that Biard is right to claim that in intuitive cognition we have a richer 
vision of the object. However, I believe we can be more precise in identifying 
exactly what exactly this richer vision consists in. It seems to me that Scotus 
has turned the predicates of existence and presence into phenomenal qualities 
of objects. Instead of having to judge that objects are present, we literally 
perceive that they exist and are present to us. To use Scotus’s terminology, 
existence and presence are formalities (formalitates) under which we grasp 
                                                   
137 Joël Biard, ‘Intention and presence: the notion of Prasentialitas in the fourteenth century’ 
in S. Heinämaa, V. Lähteenmäki, P. Remes, (Eds.) Consciousness: From Perception to 
Reflection in the History of Philosophy, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, 4 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2010) pp.123-40.  
138 Ibid., p.128.  
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the object. 139 This, I take it, is what Scotus means when he writes of 
apprehending an object “as it is existent and as it is present”. It would also 
explain why he remarks elsewhere of an object being present to the perceiver 
“in its characteristic presentness”. 140 Presence and existence, on this story, are 
properties of the object that we apprehend in intellectual vision. The 
perception of these properties is what accounts for the richer vision of which 
Biard writes.  
 
Intuitive cognition, it should be noted, is not only confined to a grasp of 
objects external to us. We can also apprehend our own internal cognitive acts 
by intuitive cognition. Scotus stated this repeatedly in the Ordinatio and the 
Quodlibet. In the Ordinatio he wrote of the importance of intuitive cognition 
for certitude of our own cognitive states: “If we did not have intuitive 
cognition of a thing, we would not know of our [cognitive] acts whether they 
were in us, or not”.141 He made a similar observation in the Quodlibet when 
writing of the ability of an angel to know its own thoughts.142 Scotus also 
states that we can have intuitive cognition of our own sensory acts. In the 
Ordinatio IV Scotus stated in passing, “the act [of perception] can be 
intuitively known when it exists”. 143 Shortly after he presented a particular 
                                                   
139 See chapter IV for a discussion of formalities.  
140 “Propria praesentialitate” - Scotus uses this phrase (which appears to turn ‘presence’ into a 
phenomenal quality of objects) in the Ordinatio IV 10.5, n.4 (XVII, p.258).  
141 Ordinatio IV 49.8.5 (XXI, p.306): “si non haberemus de aliquo cognitionem intuitivam, 
non sciremus de actibus nostris si insunt nobis, vel non”.  
142 Quodlibet 6.19 (XII, 145) 
143 Ordinatio IV 45.3.17 (XX, 348-349) 
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hypothetical situation: “The intellect intuitively recognizes that I see 
something white”.144 It is clear, then, that intuitive cognition applies not just 
to our grasp of extramental objects but also to our awareness of our own 
cognitive acts.145   
 
In this chapter I will focus on intuitive cognition of external objects, simply 
because this is the most relevant kind of cognition to the topic of this thesis 
(viz. knowledge of individual objects). I acknowledge that there is much 
material for further research on the intuitive cognition of cognitive acts. But to 
enter into this discussion goes beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 
3. The mechanisms of intuitive cognition:  
 
What exactly is occurring to facilitate our grasp of objects as existing and 
present? Scotus held that the mechanisms of intuitive cognition differ from 
abstractive cognition in one important respect: they do not involve an 
intelligible species. This is why intuitive cognition manages to attain the object 
in its concrete existence. In the Collationes, Scotus wrote:  
“There is a difference between intuitive and abstractive cognition, as 
abstractive cognition, which is through a species, is not of the thing as it 
                                                   
144 Ordinatio IV 45.3.18 (XX, 349-350) 
145 Some scholars, such as Marenbon (1987, p.168-168) and Bérubé (1964, p.201), have argued 
that intuitive cognition is solely of our own cognitive acts. It is never directed at objects in the 
external world. This view seems to me implausible. Scotus states explicitly on countless 
occasions that intuitive cognition is of ‘the object as present and existing’. Clearly he believed 
that intuitive cognition on certain occasions is directed at objects in the external world.  
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exists, nor as it is present, but can be of the thing indifferent to its absence or 
presence…but intuitive cognition is of the existent thing, as it is existing”.146 
Intuitive cognition, in other words, is unmediated by a mental representation. 
The object is present in itself, and this allows for a direct perception of 
presence and existence. 147    
 
Not only is the object present to the mind, but it is also a direct cause of the 
mental act. As Scotus stated in the Ordinatio, “it is the object in its own right 
that produces the movement”, and “the object does not act as in a species but 
as present in itself”.148 Unlike abstractive cognition, which is brought about by 
the action of the agent intellect and a species, in intuitive cognition the 
external object is a partial cause. In a later question Scotus stated this 
explicitly:  
                                                   
146 “Differentia est inter cognitionem intuitivam et abstractivam, quod cognitio abstractiva, 
quae est per speciem, non est rei ut est existens, nec ut praesens est, sed indifferenter potest 
esse rei absentis et praesentis…sed cognitio intuitiva est rei existentis, ut existens est” 
(Collationes, 36.11 (V, 301)).  
147 As I understand it, Scotus is denying the intervention of an intelligible species in intuitive 
cognition. However, some commentators have taken the aforementioned passage to rule out 
the involvement of any kind of species. Such a view seems implausible, as it would commit 
Scotus to the notion of ‘action at a distance’, an idea he elsewhere rejects. Intuitive cognition, 
like abstractive cognition, necessarily involves sensible species. These are vehicles in virtue of 
which the mind is brought into contact with the external world. Where intuitive cognition 
differs from abstractive cognition is in the involvement of intelligible species.  
148 Ordinatio III 14.4, n.15 (XIV, 539).  
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“the sufficient causes of [intuitive cognition] are the object present in its 
actual existence and the agent and possible intellects, all of which can work 
together (concurrere)”.149  
 
An interesting corollary to this is that we will only be able to have intuitive 
cognitions (in the strict sense) when objects are present to us. An absent 
object cannot cause an occurrent cognition. This is a crucial point of difference 
between Scotus and Ockham. Ockham controversially argued that intuitive 
cognitions of non-existent individual objects were possible.150 Gilson and 
Pegis argue that if we can intuit non-existing objects, then we can never be 
sure of the veridicality of intuitive cognition (and this would essentially lead 
us to scepticism).151 Scotus, in contrast, believes such acts to be impossible.152 
In this way, he avoids what is, perhaps, a sceptical trap.    
 
In the Quodlibet, Scotus clarified his account of intuitive cognition by 
describing different relations obtaining between cognitive acts and their 
objects. Both abstractive and intuitive cognitions bear a relation of ‘likeness’ 
to their objects: “the act of knowing is also related to the object participatively 
                                                   
149 “nam causae illius sufficientes sunt objectum in actuali existential praesens, et intellectus 
agens et possibilis; haec omnia possunt concurrere’’ Ordinatio IV 45.2, n.12 (XX, 305).  
150 Ockham, Ordinatio I prologue, 1 (I, 38-39). 
151 See, for example, Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: 
Ignatius, 1999), particularly part one, chapters III and IV; Anton C. Pegis, ‘Concerning 
William of Ockham’, Traditio 2 (1944), pp.465-480.  
152 This is precisely why Anthony Kenny is mistaken when he claims Scotus’s theory of 
intuitive cognition leads to scepticism. See Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind (London: 
Routledge, 1993), p.114. 
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in the way a likeness is to that of which it is the likeness”.153 By this I take 
Scotus to be referring to the representational qualities of the acts. Both acts, 
insofar as they are about certain objects, bear a relation of resemblance to 
those particular objects. Both abstractive and intuitive cognition are directed 
at common natures and in this way resemble those natures.  
 
Intuitive cognitions, however, possess an additional relation, that of ‘tending 
towards’ concrete objects existing in the external world. Scotus described the 
relation thus: “[This relation] can be called a relation that, as an intermediary 
to the end term to which it unites, formally unites, and this relation of being 
the medium of unification (medii unientis) can, in a special name, be called a 
relation of attaining something as an end term, or of tending to it as an end 
term”.154 Prima facie the idea of tending seems to refer merely to the 
characteristic of being ‘representational’. But this can’t be the case, for the 
notion of ‘likeness’ seems to already be describing this. ‘Tending’, then, must 
mean something over and above representation. I take this notion of ‘tending’ 
to refer to the characteristic of transparency that intuitive cognitions possess. 
The content of an intuitive cognition is not just similar to an object – it is in a 
certain sense identical with it. It represents so perfectly that ceases to be a 
representation but becomes structurally identical with its object. We can see 
that this is the case merely by considering the traits of an intuitive cognition – 
it represents objects in their concrete existence. It is, in this sense, 
                                                   
153 Quodlibet, 13.39 (XII, 340-342). 
154 “alio potest dici relation unientis formaliter in ratione medii ad terminum, ad quem unit, et 
ista relatio medii unientis specialiori nomine potest dici relation attingentiae alterius, ut 
termini vel tendentiae in alterum, ut in terminum.” Quodlibet, 13.12 (XII, 311-312).  
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transparent to or identical with reality. Scotus, then, provides us with a 
theory of relations that grounds his description of intuitive and abstractive 
cognition. Both aim to represent certain objects, but only one is able to ‘attain’ 
the objects through perfect representation. Intuitive cognition bears a unique 
relation of “tending to an object as its terminus”.   
 
The categories of ‘internalism’ and ‘externalism’ have become so dominant in 
contemporary epistemology that Scotus commentators have felt the need to 
place him in one of these categories. Peter King puts forward a nuanced 
‘externalist’ reading of Scotus: “the content of Socrates’s cognition depends on 
purely internal features, whereas its character depends on the world’s being a 
certain way. External factors determine what a singular thought is indeed 
directed at, as a contingent matter.”155 Richard Cross is more cautious about 
using this label: “the externalism only extends so far as singular cognition. To 
the extent that intuitive cognitions include cognition of the common nature, 
intuitive cognitions directed at different natures have different internal 
structures, just as in the case of abstractive cognitions.”156 I would argue 
however that internalism and externalism ultimately collapse into each other 
in Scotus’s account. As we have just seen, it is the relation of ‘tending’ that 
distinguishes intuitive cognition from other kinds of simple apprehension. 
The relation manifests itself in the content of the act – through the 
characteristics of existence and presence that we perceive. In this sense, we 
can know which cognitive acts are intuitive, despite their being characterized 
                                                   
155 Peter King, forthcoming, p.13. Socrates is here a character in an illustrative example 
presented by King. In the example, Socrates is looking at a cat on the floor of his room.  
156 Richard Cross, Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition (London: Oxford, 2014), p.160.  
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by a relation extrinsic to our perception. When this relation is present, we are 
able to perceive its effects and hence be aware of its presence.  
 
Objections: 
 
Few contemporary scholars have written at length on Scotus’s theory of 
intuitive cognition, and those that have have not raised many objections. Of 
the objections that have been made, it seems that most rest upon a 
misunderstanding of Scotus’s theory. Scotus’s theory seems quite defensible 
when properly interpreted.  
 
One objection made to Scotus’ theory is that it bypasses any intelligible 
species – precisely the mental entity that converts sense data into content 
accessible to the mind. This argument was put forward by Gilson and, later, 
Stephen Langston.157 Gilson asserts that the species is the very thing that 
converts the sense data from the presence of the object into knowable content. 
He argues that the mere presence of the object can cause cognition of 
existence, but the actual knowledge of what it is is caused by an intelligible 
species.158  
 
                                                   
157 See Etienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot : Introduction à ses Positions Fondamentales (Paris : 
Vrin, 1952), pp.542, 549-550, 552-553, and Douglas C. Langston, “Scotus’ doctrine of Intuitive 
and Abstractive Cognition”, Synthese 96, issue 1 (1993), pp.5-10.  
158 « Il faut donc concevoir l’intuition comme résultant d’un seul objet, mais causée par lui a 
double titre : en tant que présent, il fait voir son existence ; en tant qu’agissant par l’espèce, il 
se rend ‘connaissable’ et ‘représenté’. » Gilson, Jean Duns Scot, p.550.  
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This objection may at first seem convincing, in light of certain passages where 
Scotus describes the intelligible species as indispensible to cognition. For 
example, Scotus states in the Reportatio, a phantasm “has extension and is 
not proportioned to move the possible intellect”, and hence there is need for 
an agent intellect “to make the potential universal actual.”159 He also writes in 
the Ordinatio of the need of to convert sense data “from order to order”, 
which assumedly is referring to the need to make it intelligible to the mind.160 
Based on these passages, one might interpret Scotus as being vulnerable to the 
objection of Gilson and Langston. However, an alternative interpretation is to 
see these passages as focused on a specific problem, namely Henry of Ghent’s 
critique of the role of the intelligible species in abstractive cognition. This 
interpretation seems to be more consistent with Scotus’s statements about 
intuitive cognition bypassing species. In the Ordinatio passage it seems that 
Scotus is focused on the indispensible role of the intelligible species in 
abstractive cognition. I contend that he is not ruling out the possibility of 
direct cognition by other means (such as through intuitive cognition). 
 
Scotus, after all, provides an explanation for how content could be supplied 
without an intelligible species. Recall the explanation given in section 3: the 
                                                   
159 [phantasma] est extensum et improportionale ad movendum intellectum possibilem”. 
There is need for an agent intellect “facere universale in actu de unversali in potentia”. 
Reportatio I-A 3.4, n.103 (See p.233 of the following provisional critical edition: Allan B. 
Wolter and Oleg V. Bychkov, The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture: Reportatio I-A (St. 
Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 2004)).  
160 Ordinatio I 3.6 (IX, 243): “De ordine ad ordinem”. Scotus is here drawing upon an 
expression used previously by Averroes.  
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object itself, present in a sensible species, is made accessible to the mind by 
virtue of the agent intellect acting on it and giving it the necessary qualities to 
‘appear’ in the intellectual realm. There is no species or mental image 
produced during this process. The mind perceives the object itself, in its 
concrete existence. This observation alone seems sufficient to address Gilson 
and Langston’s criticism.  
 
Another objection that could perhaps be made of Scotus, although never 
directly made against him explicitly, is that any notion of perceiving essences 
below the surface of the level of appearances seems to be ‘extranatural’, 
insofar as it takes us beyond a world of multifarious sensations to a kind of 
“pure perception of bare essences”.161 To be more precise, an idea like intuitive 
cognition takes us beyond a naturalistic account of perception into a kind of 
mysterious idealism. In any event, the clarity presupposed by the idea of 
intellectual vision simply doesn’t map on to the vagueness of our everyday 
perception of the world.  
 
It is indeed true that our perceptions of objects vary in accuracy. Often we will 
mistake one kind of object for another, and sometimes we will think we see an 
object present before us when it is not really there. Scotus certainly did not 
deal with this criticism directly, but I think we find in his writings the 
resources to explain imperfect cognitions. As he wrote in Question 13 of the 
Quodlibet, two relations have to obtain between an object and the mind for an 
                                                   
161 Paul MacDonald, Knowledge and the Transcendent: An Inquiry into the Mind’s 
relationship to God (Washington: CUA, 2010), p.128. MacDonald considers the objection in 
relation to Aquinas’s writing, but I think the same might be said of Scotus.  
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intuitive cognition to occur. The first is that the mind accurately grasps the 
form of the object (the relation of the measurable to its measure); the second 
is that the intellectual act terminates in the actual object present in the world 
(the relation of reaching out and coming into contact with the other term).162 
It is the second relation that would offer space for the phenomenon under 
consideration. The explanation for vague or inaccurate cognitions is that they 
do not make contact with the object as their end term. That is to say, the 
relatio attingentiae alterius ut termini is absent. This relation of attaining the 
object as a terminus is necessary for it classify as an intuitive cognition. A 
vague cognitive act lacks this relation, and hence would not, strictly speaking, 
classify as an intuitive cognition (though it perhaps bears resemblance to an 
intuitive cognition). It may in fact be that intuitive cognition is a rarer 
phenomenon than we might at first suppose. I do not wish to be detained in 
speculation; suffice to say I think there are adequate resources in Scotus’s 
philosophy to address this objection.  
 
Rather than labelling Scotus’s account ‘extranatural’, Pasnau has suggested 
that Scotus’s notion of intuitive cognition, via the senses, is all too ordinary. 
Pasnau, it seems, sees little difference between Scotus’s account and 
something provided by Aquinas. Scotus’s account is for him “less interesting” 
than others have supposed.163 However, Scotus is clearly telling us something 
more than Aquinas. He provides us with a sophisticated explanation of how 
we apprehend singular objects. As I will discuss in my concluding chapter, this 
                                                   
162 Quodlibet 13.35 (Wadding edition XII v.3, 525-526) 
163 Robert Pasnau, “Cognition”, in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p.300. Cf. Ibid., p.286.  
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seems to be a significant improvement on Aquinas’s notion of a conversio ad 
phantasmata.  
 
Conclusion:  
 
Scotus’s solution to the problem of singular knowledge was to posit the 
existence of a novel kind of cognitive operation – intuitive cognition. Through 
intuitive cognition, the human intellect is able to apprehend common natures 
that have been instantiated as individuals in the world. In this chapter I have 
offered an interpretation of intuitive cognition, according to which it is a 
cognitive operation that bypasses intelligible species but that which 
nevertheless relies upon the agent intellect. The agent intellect acts together 
with some object in the world to cause an occurrent cognition. It is in this way 
that we are able to obtain knowledge about individual objects. 
 
Scotus’s solution, I contend, offers a plausible response to Sellars ‘Myth of the 
Given’ objection. Sense data are no longer presumed to be automatically 
available to the cognitive faculties. Scotus rejected Aquinas’s belief in the 
“pseudo-intentionality” of the senses.164 In its place he offered an account of 
simple apprehension in which the mind itself, not the senses, apprehends the 
singular object. In this chapter, I hope to have shown that he offered a 
plausible explanation of the mechanisms behind this foundational cognitive 
operation. I will defend my contention further in my concluding chapter. For 
now it will suffice merely to indicate the direction of my argument.  
                                                   
164 Cf. ‘Being and Being Known’, n.18.  
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In the next chapter I will examine the account of intuitive cognition provided 
by William of Ockham. Ockham explained intuitive cognition by developing 
what scholars have called an ‘act’ theory of cognition. I will argue that 
Ockham’s alternative explanation falls victim to one serious objection. Scotus, 
in contrast, has the resources to deal with the objections levelled at his 
account. I will return to the comparison of Scotus, Ockham and Aquinas in the 
final chapter of this thesis.  
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Chapter V: Ockham on singular cognition 
 
1. Introduction: 
 
Whereas Aquinas grounded his cognitive psychology in a traditional 
interpretation of Aristotle, William of Ockham was not afraid to reinterpret or 
dissent from ‘The Philosopher’. Ockham rejected the Aristotelian notion that 
essences have some sort of extra-mental existence. He claimed that essences, 
though caused by objects in the external world, were purely entities of the 
mind. On this new ‘conceptualist’ foundation Ockham developed a novel 
cognitive psychology, vastly different from Scotus or Aquinas.165  
 
In this chapter, I will describe this new cognitive psychology, focusing 
particularly on its implications for the problem of the knowledge of particulars. 
I will discuss Ockham’s repudiation of the Aristotelian realism of Scotus and 
Aquinas, as well as his rejection of the species doctrine. Ockham proposed as 
an alternative the idea that cognitive acts in themselves have the ability to 
signify objects in the external world, and that reference is fixed by this ‘act 
                                                   
165 Various scholars have applied the label ‘conceptualist’ to Ockham. See for example 
Philotheus Boehner, ‘The Realistic Conceptualism of William of Ockham’, Traditio 4 (1946), 
pp.307-335, and Alan Wolter, The Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1990) p.65. This label is preferable to the label more commonly 
applied to Ockham, ‘nominalist’. ‘Nominalist’ implies that universals have no grounding 
whatsoever in the world, whereas ‘conceptualist’ allows for some link between universals in 
the mind and external reality. And Ockham did believe in such a link, as will be shown in 
section 2.   
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signification’, combined with causal relations between particular objects and 
the mind. In the final sections of the chapter, I will evaluate two common 
criticisms made of Ockham’s theory. I will argue that one of these criticisms 
fails, but that the other proves problematic for Ockham’s account.166  
 
1. The evolution of Ockham’s cognitive psychology:  
 
Ockham’s major philosophical works were produced within quite a short 
space of time (roughly 1317-1325).167 Nevertheless, there does seem to have 
been an ‘evolution’ in his views on cognitive psychology. In his earlier works, 
such as his Reportatio (c.1317-1319), he defends what has been labeled the 
‘objective existence theory’. On this theory, concepts have what he calls 
‘objective existence’ in the mind. By this he means that they are present in the 
mind as ‘known objects’, but without being present as “real entities existing in 
the soul”.168 There is much that could be said to further explain this theory, 
but I will not do so as I wish to focus on his more mature view. This mature 
view, known as the ‘act theory’ of cognition, is defended most stridently in his 
                                                   
166 The translations used in this chapter have been taken from William of Ockham: 
Philosophical Writings, trans. Philotheus Boehner O.F.M. (Indianapolis IN: Hackett 
Publishing, 1990), and William of Ockham: The Quodlibetal Questions vol. 1-2 Questions 1-7, 
trans. Alfred J. Freddoso and Francis E. Kelley (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).  
167 Cf. William J. Courtenay, ‘The Academic and Intellectual Works of William of Ockham’, in 
Paul Vincent Spade (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Ockham (London: Cambridge, 2006), 
pp.17-30; Paul Vincent Spade and Claude Panaccio, ‘William of Ockham’, in Edward N. Zalta 
(ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011), published online at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/ockham/, accessed on the 17/11/2014.  
168 Expositio in Librum Perihermenias Aristotelis prologue, sect. 7 (OPh II, 359).  
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Quodlibetal Questions (c.1324-1325) and his Commentary on Aristotle’s 
Physics (before 1324). According to the act theory of cognition, simple 
apprehension does not require the presence of some mental representation in 
the mind. All that is needed for an operation of intuitive cognition is the 
presence of the object.  
 
I will explain Ockham’s act theory in greater depth in the subsequent sections 
of this chapter. Suffice to say here that I will focus on the act theory of 
cognition instead of Ockham’s earlier theory. The act theory best represents 
Ockham’s strident reaction to the supposed metaphysical excesses of 
Aquinas’s cognitive psychology.   
 
2. Ockham’s ‘conceptualism’: 
 
The key difference between Ockham and scholastic orthodoxy was that 
Ockham subscribed to a kind of conceptualism about essences. He believed 
that knowledge of the universals that particulars fall under was ultimately the 
product of our minds. The essences we grasp have no extra-mental existence 
in things.169 This is obviously in direct contrast to Aquinas’s contention that 
natures (roughly synonymous with essences) are present in ‘a material mode’ 
in individual things.170 Likewise, he rejected Scotus’ notion that common 
                                                   
169 Summa Totius Logicae, I.15 (OPh I, 54). Cf. Quodlibet V.12. (OTh IX, 528-531) 
170 Thomas Aquinas, Sententia Libri De Anima, II, Lectura XII, no. 378.     
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natures were instantiated – or, to use the Scotistic phrase, ‘joined to 
singularity’ - in particular objects.171  
 
In the place of the traditional account of the ‘abstraction’ of species, Ockham 
argued that we form, as opposed to abstract, concepts. The mind creates 
species concepts when it comes into contact with individual members of a 
species. Where a member of class ‘x’ is present to the mind, the mind is 
prompted to form a concept of the class. Importantly, there is no abstraction 
of the essence from the individual taking place. The essence has no existence 
outside the mind. Rather, the individual extra-mental thing causes the 
formation of the species concept.172  
 
Once we have apprehended these species concepts, we are able to form higher 
order concepts based on these initial ideas. The concept of animal, for 
                                                   
171 John Duns Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, XII.q.18, n.48. 
See chapter IV section 1.1.  
172 Ockham’s theory of ‘species’ concept formation was a very significant departure from the 
traditional scholastic Aristotelian account. He does not only reject the notion of abstraction, 
but also abandons the idea of concept formation by induction. On the conventional account, 
based on passages in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, concepts are formed by a process of 
induction. After acquaintance with numerous members of the species, we are able to form 
auniversal concept of the species. Ockham dissents from this view, arguing that cognition of 
just one member of species is sufficient to obtain a concept of that species. Hence he writes in 
the Quodlibet, I.13, “the concept of the species and the concept being are simultaneously 
caused by the extra-mental thing” (OTh IX, 78). This notion is ultimately linked to his idea of 
intuitive cognition (to be discussed in section 4).  
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instance, is formed once we have concepts of different animal species.173 
Metaphysical concepts of genus and species, substance and accidents, are 
formed subsequent to this initial process.174  
 
3. Abstractive vs. intuitive cognition in Ockham’s philosophy: 
 
According to Aquinas there is only one kind of simple apprehension – 
abstractive cognition. In abstractive cognition we abstract an essence from a 
sense representation of an object, and cognize this essence as a universal. 
Ockham, following Scotus, gave a new definition to the operation of 
abstractive cognition, and posited a second kind of simple apprehension, 
intuitive cognition.  
 
Intuitive cognition is the cognitive operation in which the mind apprehends 
objects as existing here and now.  It is the special capacity with which we can 
apprehend the existence or non-existence of objects in the world. Ockham 
writes in the Sentences: “[intuitive cognition is that] by the mediation of 
which a thing is cognized to exist when it exists and not to exist when it does 
not exist.”175 For intuitive cognition to take place, we need to be in sufficient 
physical proximity to an object: “intuitive cognition cannot be naturally 
                                                   
173 Quodlibet, I.13 (OTh IX, 77-78). 
174 Quodlibet, IV.35. (OTh IX, 469-474).  
175 “…per notitiam intuitivum rei potest evidenter cognosci res non esse quando non est vel si 
non sit.” Commentarium in Librum Primum Sententiarum, Prologue, 1 (OTh I, 70) 
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caused except when [its] object is present at a determinate distance.”176 
Intuitive cognition also serves another purpose: it is the primitive cognitive 
act in which we first come into contact with singular objects: “That very same 
singular which is sensed first by the sense is itself, under the same description, 
intellectively cognized first with intuitive cognition by the intellect.”177 It is 
only through intuitive cognition that we are able to form propositions about 
objects present to us: “if I see with intuitive cognition a body and whiteness, 
immediately [my] intellect can form this complex: ‘There is a body,’ ‘There is a 
white thing,’ or ‘A body is white.’”178  
 
Abstractive cognition, according to Ockham, has a number of senses. In one 
sense, it is just what Aquinas thought it was – the apprehension of a universal. 
At one point in the Sentences, Ockham calls abstractive cognition the 
acquisition of a universal after a series of intuitive cognitions: “in this [sense] 
abstractive cognition is nothing other than the cognition of a universal 
                                                   
176 “…cognitio intuitiva non possit naturaliter causari nisi quando obiectum est praesens in 
determinata distantia…” Commentarium in Librum Secundum Sententiarum 13 (OTh V, 259). 
I am here referring to intuitive cognition of existents. Of course, physical proximity is 
something impossible when you have an intuitive cognition of a non-existent object. 
177 “Illud idem singulare quod primo sentitur a sensu idem et sub eadem ratione primo 
intelligitur intuitive ab intellectu…” Commentarium in Librum Primum Sententiarum 3.6 
(OTh II, 494). 
178 “…si videam intuitive corpus et albedinem, statim intellectus potest formare hoc 
complexum ‘corpus est’, ‘album est’ vel ‘corpus est album’…” Commentarium in Librum 
Secundum Sententiarum 13 (OTh V, 256–7). 
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abstractable from many things.”179 Elsewhere, he defines abstractive cognition 
as every other cognitive operation apart from intuitive cognition (including 
the apprehension of mental sentences and even acts of judgement).180 Perhaps 
the sense most relevant to this discussion is the following: abstractive 
cognition is, like intuitive cognition, an apprehension of a particular, but it 
takes place when the object is absent and does not allow us to form and verify 
contingent judgments about the world. Abstractive cognition, in this sense, is 
the grasp of an individual object in a way indifferent to its existence or non-
existence in the world. Ockham states in the prologue to the Sentences: “an 
abstractive cognition of a contingent thing is one by virtue of which it is not 
possible to know evidently whether the thing exists or not.”181 
 
If we adopt this last sense of abstractive cognition, we can establish a clear 
dichotomy between the two kinds of cognition. Intuitive cognition gives us our 
initial grasp of individual objects (just as they are here and now). Abstractive 
cognition also grasps the individual, but only after the individual is absent. It 
is parasitic upon the initial intuitive cognition, and cannot of itself verify the 
existence or non-existence of the object being cognized.  
 
                                                   
179 “et sic cognitio abstrativa non est aliud quam cognitio alicuius univeralis abstrahibilis a 
multis…” Commentarium in Librum Primum Sententiarum Prologue 1 (OTh I, 30). 
180 Commentarium in Librum Secundum Sententiarum 13 (OTh V, 257). I assume he would 
stop short of calling reasoning a kind of abstractive cognition. 
181 “Notitia autem abstractive est illa virtute cuius de re contingente non potest sciri evidenter 
utrum sit vel non sit.’’ Commentarium in Librum Primum Sententiarum prologue 1 (OTh 1, 
31–2). 
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Ockham focused on intuitive cognition when developing his account of 
singular knowledge. An abstract thought of an individual does not grasp it as 
an object existing in the world. Intuitive cognition, on the other hand, gives us 
access to the individual as existing here and now in front us. In the remainder 
of this chapter, I will examine how Ockham explained our capacity to have 
intuitive cognitions of individual objects. 
 
4. Ockham’s act theory of cognition, and his causal theory of 
thought character: 
 
There are two theories that inform Ockham’s account of cognition of singulars. 
The first of these is his act theory of cognition, and second is his causal theory 
of thought character. According to Ockham, both are needed to explain 
intuitive cognition of singular objects. I will discuss the two theories in turn.   
 
4.1 Ockham’s act theory of cognition: 
 
Ockham rejected Aquinas’ and Scotus’ notion of a formal isomorphism 
between mind and world during cognition. He asserted that the idea of forms 
being present intentionally in the mind was unnecessary. There were 
alternative ways of explaining the intentionality of our thoughts. We need not 
resort to such heavy metaphysical machinery to explain cognition.182 Thus he 
wrote: 
                                                   
182 Summa Totius Logicae, I, 12 (OPh I, 43). 
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“all the theoretical advantages that derive from postulating entities distinct 
from acts of understanding can be had without making such a distinction, 
for an act of understanding can signify something and can supposit for 
something just as well as any sign. Therefore, there is no point in postulating 
anything over and above the act of understanding”.183  
This is a quintessential case of Ockham using his razor. He asserts that we can 
explain cognition without reference to a mental representation (be it a fictum 
or an species intelligibilis). This alone is reason enough to abandon the notion 
of ‘forms’ present in the mind.  
 
In his mature thought,184 Ockham proposed what has been called the ‘act 
theory of cognition’. On this theory,185 a mental act is sufficient to signify some 
class of objects ‘x’ in the external world. There is no need for a mental 
representation that directs the mind to external objects. The very act of 
cognition of the class of objects ‘x’ is sufficient to provide this intentionality. 
The act of cognition itself bears a relation of similarity to the class ‘x’. And this 
relation of similarity is sufficient to produce signification. Hence Ockham 
                                                   
183 “Omnia autem quae salvantur ponendo aliquid distinctum ab actu intelligendi possunt 
salvari sine tali distincto, eo quod supponere pro alio et significare aliud ita potest competere 
actui intelligendi sicut alii signo. Igitur praeter actum intelligendi non oportet aliquid aliud 
ponere.” (Summa Totius Logicae I, 12; OPh I, 43). The translation provided is from trans. 
Michael J. Loux, Ockham’s Theory of Terms: Part I of the Summa Logicae (Indiana: Notre 
Dame Press, 1974), p.74.  
184 Due to the constraints of this thesis, I am here addressing only Ockham's later theory of 
cognition. His earlier ‘Objective existence’ theory is described and critiqued in Marilyn 
McCord Adams’ 'Ockham’s on Natural Signification', The Monist, 61, no.3 (July 1978).  
185 Expositio Super Librum Perihermenias, I, sect. 6 (OTh II, 351-358).  
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wrote, “No prior assimilation through a species is required before an act of 
intellectively cognizing. Rather, the assimilation suffices that comes about 
through the act of intellectively cognizing, which is [itself] a likeness of the 
thing cognized”.186  
 
The idea is quite a radical step away from the canonical rational psychology 
expounded by Aquinas. Aquinas had proposed a system in which we access 
extra-mental universals by virtue of a form or intelligible species present in 
the mind. Forms present in the mind are necessary vehicles to achieve this. 
Without them, there is nothing to provide content to our thoughts –thoughts 
without forms as their objects are essentially thoughts without content.187 
Ockham offered a groundbreaking alternative to this approach. The act theory 
of cognition suggests that a mere similarity relation holding between the 
external object and the mental act is sufficient to provide mental content. 
There is no need for an isomorphism between the mind and reality. The 
resemblance of a mental act to a class ‘x’ provides specific intentional content 
– content about class ‘x’ – to our thoughts.  
 
4.2. Ockham’s causal theory of thought character: 
 
                                                   
186 “non requiritur ante actum intelligendi aliqua assimilation praevia quae sit per speciem. 
Sed sufficit assimilatio quae fit per actum intelligendi qui est similitudo rei cognitae.’’ 
Reportatio II.12-13 (OTh V, 295-96). 
187 For Aquinas, see Summa Theologica I.85, art.2. For Scotus see Ordinatio I, d.3 p.3 q.1.  
 104 
In Ockham’s system, the act theory had as its complement what I shall call a 
causal theory of thought character.188 This latter theory was crucial for 
explaining how we know individual objects. According to Ockham, the act 
theory was inadequate to explain thoughts about particulars.    
 
Our cognitive acts, Ockham asserted, pick out objects at the level of class, not 
individuality. The similarity relation holds between cognitive acts and classes, 
not individuals. Certainly, our cognitive acts are sufficient to pick out one class 
to the exclusion of others. However, they are incapable of distinguishing 
between one particular individual over another. Hence Ockham writes in the 
Commentary on the Perihermenias,  
“By such a common or confused intellection, singular things outside 
the mind are known. For instance, to say that we have a confused 
intellection of man means that we have a cognition by which we do 
not understand one man rather than another, but that by such a 
cognition we have cognition of a man rather than a donkey”.189  
                                                   
188 By thought character I am referring to the nature of a particular thought (i.e. a singular 
thought or a general thought) rather than what it has as intentional content. There is a crucial 
difference between the former and the latter. Mere intentional content is insufficient to fix 
whether a thought is about a singular object or many objects. Many different objects can have 
the same external features, but still be distinct objects, as Scotus observed. Thought character 
– 
i.e. the singularity or generality of thought – is fixed by features external to the thinker’s 
awareness. It is, according to Ockham, fixed by a causal relation holding between an object 
and the thought.  
189 Expositio Super Librum Perihermenias, prologue (OPh II, 355): “Ad primum potest dici 
quod tali intellectione confusa intelliguntur tales res singulares extra, sicut haere intentionem 
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Similarly, he writes in the Quodlibet, “No simple abstractive cognition is more 
a likeness of one singular thing than of another exactly like it”.190  
 
Ockham’s way of explaining our cognition of singulars was to supplement the 
act theory of cognition with a causal theory of thought character. The theory is 
that singular thoughts are about singular things (and those things exculsively) 
because the singular things have caused the thoughts. A relation of efficient 
causality always holds between an object and any thought about that object. 
This very fact causes those thoughts to be about the particular object. Thus 
Ockham writes in the Quodlibet:  
“I reply that an intuitive cognition is a proper cognition of a singular 
thing not because of its greater likeness to the one thing than to the 
other, but because it is naturally caused by the one thing and not by 
the other, and is not able to be caused by the other”.191  
Similarly, in the Ordinatio, he remarks:   
                                                                                                                                                 
hominis confusam non est aliud quam habere unam intentionem qua non magis intelligitur 
unus homo quam alius, et tamen tali cognitione magis cognoscitur sive intelligitur homo 
quam asinus; et hoc non est aliud dicere quam quod talis cognitio aliquo modo assimilationis 
magis assimilatur homini quam asino, et tamen non magis illi homini quam isti…”. Cf. 
Ordinatio I, d.2, q.8 (OTh II, 266-292).  
190 Quodlibet, I.13 (OTh IX, 74): “Nulla cognitio abstractiva simplex est plus similitudo unius 
rei singularis quam alterius sibi simillimae”.  
191 “Dico quod intuitiva est propria cognitio singularis, non propter maiorem assimilationem 
uni quam alteri, sed quia naturaliter ab uno et non ab altero causatur, nec potest ab altero 
causari.” Quodlibet, I.13 (OTh IX, 76). 
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“Even though the intellect is a likeness to all things of the same species, 
it is able, however, to know determinately the one and not the other. 
But this is not on account of likeness, but (its) cause”.192  
Evidently, Ockham believed a causal relation between the object and the 
thought produced the thought’s intentionality.  
 
Ockham, I contend, is proposing a kind of ‘externalism about thought’ (the 
view that the character of a thought is fixed by features external to the 
thinker’s awareness). Singular thoughts are made to be singular thoughts not 
by some feature of the thought’s content, but rather the causal relation 
holding between the thought and the object that caused it. Peter King and 
Claude Panaccio rightly apply this label to Ockham’s theory.193 Ockham’s 
descriptions of his causal theory strongly suggest that singular thought is fixed 
by factors external to the content of the thought itself.     
 
Susan Brower-Toland has challenged this externalist reading of Ockham. 194  
She refers to texts in which Ockham writes of the possibility of divine 
                                                   
192 “licet intellectus assimiletur omnibus individuis [eiusdem speciei] aequaliter…, tamen 
potest unum determinate cognoscere et non aliud. Sed hoc non est propter assimilationem, 
sed causa”. Reportatio II, q.12-13 (OTh V, 287).   
193 See Claude Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts (Surrey: Ashgate Press, 2005), pp.12-14, and 
Peter King, ‘Thinking About Things: Singular Thought in the Middle Ages’ in Gyula Klima 
(ed.) Intentionality, Cognition and Representation in the Middle Ages, (New York: Fordam 
University Press, forthcoming), accessed from 
http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/articles/Thinking_about_Things.pdf on the 4/05/2014. 
194 See Susan Brower-Toland in “Intuitionism, Externalism and Direct Reference in Ockham”, 
History of Philosophy Quarterly 24 (2007), pp.317-336. 
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intervention in the process of intuitive cognition.195 God has the power to 
cause intuitive cognitions of objects in the material world. Hence ‘natural 
causal pathways’ are interrupted by the ever-present possibility of ‘divine 
interference’. In light of this, it becomes hard to say that a necessary causal 
relationship obtains between particular thoughts and particular objects. How 
do we really know the thought has been caused ‘naturally’ rather than 
‘supernaturally’? Brower-Toland goes on to suggest an internalist reading of 
Ockham, according to which singular thought is what it is merely in virtue of 
having some individual thing as its intentional object.196   
 
Toland’s objection is reasonable one, but a close inspection of Ockham’s 
comments on divine necessity reveals that his causal theory of divine 
intervention is compatible with his notion of naturally necessary causal 
relations. Rather than attempting a glib dismissal of the claim, I will address 
this objection at length in the next section.  
 
5. Resolving the tension between Ockham’s causal theory and his 
views on the contingency of the natural world: 
 
Toland’s objection is a criticism often made of Ockham. There appears to be a 
tension between his causal theory of thought character and his supposed 
belief in the radical contingency of the laws of the natural world. Historically, 
                                                   
195 Some of texts referred to include the Commentarium in Librum Primum Sententiarum 
Prologue q. 1 (OTh I, 30-31); Reportatio II, qq., 12-13 (OTh V, 284); Quodlibet 5.5 (OTh IX, 
496). 
196 Brower-Toland, 2007, p.329.  
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this objection has been the main reason why philosophers have rejected 
Ockham's theory.197 In this section I will outline the basic tenets of this 
objection. I will then suggest that this criticism relies on a misinterpretation of 
Ockham's understanding of the natural world. I will propose that we can 
distinguish between Ockham's understanding of logical necessity and natural 
necessity, and that we should consider only the latter when assessing the 
tenability of his causal theory of reference. Once this distinction is made, we 
see that the theory is coherent.    
 
Ockham asserted that the natural world is contingent in its structure - it could 
very easily have been different to what it is if God so willed it. It is not logically 
necessary that the causal structure of our world be the way it is. Fundamental 
physical laws could have been different, and, particularly relevant to our 
purposes, the causal relations between objects and the mind could have been 
different. Ockham indicates this in various places in his corpus.198 And he is 
not making any groundbreaking claims - Aquinas and Scotus made similar 
assertions.199   
 
However, Ockham entered uncharted philosophical terrain when discussing 
the possibility of supernatural intervention in the realm of thought. Ockham 
                                                   
197 See for example Etienne Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York: 
Ignatius, 1999), ch.III-IV, and Anton C. Pegis, ‘Concerning William of Ockham’ Traditio, 2 
(1944) pp.465-480.  
198 See for example, Quodlibet I.5, II.10, and VI.6 (OTh IX, 29-35, 156-161, 604-607), and 
Commentarium in Librum Primum Sententiarum d. 44 (OTh IV, 650-661). 
199 For Aquinas see Summa Theologica, I q.19, art.3. For Scotus see Reportatio I-A, d.39.   
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claimed that God could cause a thought in the mind of a non-existing object. 
In his Quodlibet, Ockham wrote:  
“Intuitive cognition of a non-existent object is possible by the divine 
power. I prove this first by the article of faith 'I believe in God the 
Father almighty', which I understand in the following sense: Anything 
is to be attributed to the divine power, when it does not contain a 
manifest contradiction. But that this [i.e. cognition of a non- existent 
object] should be produced by the power of God, does not contain a 
contradiction; therefore, etc. Again, on this article is based the famous 
maxim of the theologians: 'Whatever God can produce by means of 
secondary causes, He can directly produce and preserve without 
them'. From this maxim I argue thus: Every effect which God can 
produce by means of a secondary cause He can produce directly on 
His own account. God can produce intuitive sense cognition by means 
of an object; hence He can produce it directly on His own account.”200  
The significance of this passage is that it seems to imply that the causal action 
of the object is not necessary to bring about a thought of the object. God could 
                                                   
200 Quodlibet VI.6 (OTh IX, 604): “Cognitio intuitiva potest esse per potentiam divinam de 
obiecto non existente. Quod probo primo per articulum fidei: “Credo in Deum Patrem 
omnipotentem”. Quem sic intelligo quod quodlibet est divinae potentiae attribuendum quod 
non includit manifestam contradictionem; igitur etc. Praeterea in illo articulo fundatur illa 
propositio famosa theologorum ‘quidquid Deus producit mediantibus causis secundis, potest 
immediate sine illis producere et conservare’. Ex ista propositione arguo sic: omnem effectum 
quem potest Deus mediante causa secunda, potest immediate per se; sed in notitiam 
intuitivam corporalem potest mediante obiecto; igitur potest in eam immediate per se”. The 
English translation has been taken from Philosophical Writings – A Selection: William of 
Ockham trans. Philotheus Boehner O.F.M. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1990).  
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easily cause a thought of an object, whilst not producing the object of that 
thought. His causal action would not in anyway impinge on the content of the 
thought. If this is the case, then it seems lines of causality do not determine 
the character of a thought.201 
 
Based on this passage and others similar to it, Adams et al claim a 
contradiction in Ockham's writing. He thinks that the causal structure of the 
natural world is radically contingent, and yet he thinks an essential 
relationship exists between particular mental acts and their objects. It seems 
that something has to give – either one holds that there are no essential causal 
relationships between things in the natural world, or one rejects the view that 
the world is radically contingent. The two positions are mutually exclusive.  
 
In response to Adams' criticism, I argue that there is a crucial distinction in 
Ockham’s theory of causality between logical necessity and natural necessity. 
Ockham's causal theory of reference is grounded in the latter, and hence 
remains unaffected by his strong views on divine omnipotence. Ockham, as a 
theologian, is obliged to acknowledge the possibility of supernatural 
phenomena interfering with the natural order of things. Aquinas and Scotus 
do the same with their treatment of miracles.202 However, Ockham holds such 
supernatural phenomena to be so rare that he preserves a parallel natural 
account of causality alongside the theological picture of radical contingency. 
                                                   
201 Which is to say, lines of causality do not determine whether a thought is a general or a 
singular one.  
202 For Aquinas, see Summa Contra Gentiles, III.101. For Scotus see Reportatio I-A, d. 44, q. 1, 
n. 9.    
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Hence he provides two "conclusions" to the question of intuition of non-
existence. The first – the theological conclusion, based on an article of faith – 
was quoted above. In the second conclusion, he states, "So far as natural 
causes are in question, an intuitive cognition cannot be caused or preserved if 
the object does not exist..."203 Here we see the two approaches of Ockham - 
one concerning the abstruse realm of theological possibility, the other 
concerning the natural order of things.204205 
 
Insofar as Ockham's causal theory of reference is grounded in a naturalistic 
account of causality, divorced from his theological speculations, it can sit 
comfortably alongside his account of divine omnipotence. The two do not 
                                                   
203 “quamvis naturaliter notitia intuitiva non possit esse sine existentia rei, quae est vere causa 
efficiens notitiae intuitivae mediata vel imediata…” Commentarium in Librum Primum 
Sententiarum prologue, q.1 (OTh I, 38).  
204 As Day observes, Ockham distinguishes between facts which are "secundum se et 
necessario" (according to the thing itself and necessarily) and "secundum nos et contingenter" 
(according to us and contingently). See Sebastian Day, Intuitive Cognition (New York: The 
Franciscan Institute, 1947) p.163. The first category refers to an absolute necessity, whereas 
the later refers to necessity based on contingent state of the world. To further explain the 
latter category: the world could have been otherwise, if God has chosen to make it that way. 
But considering the way he contingently has chosen to make it, certain things are now 
necessary (unless God choses to intervene with a miracle).  
205 Interestingly, in the Quodlibet V.5 Ockham denies that God could produce in us an 
intuitive cognition of an absent object: "I reply that God cannot cause in us a cognition 
through which it would evidently appear to us that a thing is present when it is absent, since 
this involves a contradiction..." (OTh IX, 498). If we take this quote as an expression of his 
most mature thought, then it seems Ockham's almighty God could never play the role of a 
Cartesian evil demon.  
 112 
overlap. There are essential relations between objects and thoughts that 
obtain in the natural order, and this is all that is needed to support Ockham's 
theory. 
 
6. The unsolved mystery of act signification: 
 
As stated in section 3, Ockham’s act theory of cognition claims that cognitive 
acts are sufficient to signify groups of objects in the external world. When 
developing this theory Ockham argues that there is a natural relation of 
similarity that obtains between the act of cognition and the objects of the class 
‘x’. The act of cognition naturally – independent of any positing of the mind – 
shares the relation of resemblance to these external objects.206 Importantly, it 
is not some quality shared by the act and the object that underpins the 
similarity relation. Ockham takes an anti-reductive approach to similarity.207 
                                                   
206 Commentarium in Librum Primum Sententiarum 30.5. (OTh IV, 385). 
207 I am here adopting Adams interpretation of Ockham’s views on similarity (See Adams, 
1978, p.447). Adams bases her view the following passage from the Ordinatio,: “Si dicatur 
quod Sortes et Plato plus conveniunt realiter quam Sortes et asinus, igitur Sortes et Plato in 
aliquo reali conveniunt in quo no conveniunt realiter Sortes et asinus, sed non in Sorte nec in 
Platone, igitur in aliquo, alio modo distincto, et illud est commune utrique, respondeo quod 
de virtute sermonis non debet concedi quod Sortes et Plato conveniunt in aliquo nec in 
aliquibus, sed quod conveniunt aliquibus, quia se ipsis, et quod convenit cum Platone non ‘in 
aliquo’ sed ‘aliquo’, quia se ipso”. Commentarium in Librum Primum Sententiarum, 2.6; 
(OTh II, 211-12). Ockham rejects the view that Sortes and Plato are similar in virtue of a 
common property. Rather, Sortes and Plato just are similar. They are similar “se ipsis”, and 
not in virtue of some shared attribute. 
 113 
It is the act in itself that is similar to the objects. In other words, the 
relationship obtains at an object level, not a feature or trait level.  
 
This theory of act signification is an aspect of Ockham’s theory that has 
attracted significant criticism from commentators. The key objection that is 
made is that Ockham fails to explain how an act can resemble some class of 
objects. Joel Biard puts the objection thus: “[on the act theory of cognition] 
the idea of similitude loses some of its sense. For we might admit a 
resemblance between a thing and a concept endowed with esse obiectivum, 
but what does resemblance between a thing and an act mean?”208 Adams 
begins from a similar starting point, and after discussing what she sees as the 
various options open to Ockham, concludes that none adequately explain how 
cognitive acts can have a ‘comparative resemblance’ to particular classes of 
objects.209  
 
I propose to take a similar approach to Adams, and describe the options 
available. In the end, though, I do not think any option adequately solves this 
conceptual-exegetical issue.  
 
Where cognition is concerned, Ockham is working with relations of 
comparative resemblance. A relationship of resemblance simpliciter can 
trivially obtain between any two things, as Adams observes.210 However, 
                                                   
208 Joel Biard, Guillaume d’Ockham. Logique et philosophie (Paris: PUF, 1997), p.120.  
209 Marilyn McCord Adams, 'Ockham’s on Natural Signification', The Monist, 61, no.3 (July 
1978).  
210 Ibid., p.447.  
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Ockham is referring to a relationship whereby two things are more similar to 
each other than to a range of other entities in the world. I reproduce an 
important passage from Perihermenias quoted above:  
“To have a confused intention of man is only to have an intention by which 
one man is no more understood than another and nevertheless by such a 
cognition a man is more cognized or understood than a donkey. And this is 
only to say that such a cognition is, by some sort of similarity more similar to a 
man than to a donkey and nevertheless not more similar to that man than to 
this one…”211 The question is whether Ockham has sufficient resources to 
explain why a cognitive act ‘z’ would be comparatively more similar to class ‘x’ 
of objects than class ‘y’.  
 
The first issue encountered is the fact that mental acts are ultimately more 
similar to mental entities than to anything in the outside world. Before one 
can address how mental acts might be similar to particular kinds of extra-
mental things, one needs to ascertain why the mental act would signify an 
extra-mental object at all, and not some other mental quality. The solution 
that Marilyn Adams proposes on Ockham’s behalf is “to exclude from 
consideration any similarities that result from the fact that the act is a mental 
                                                   
211 Expositio Super Librum Perihermenias, prologue (OPh II, 352): “intellectionem hominis 
confusam non est aliud quam habere unam cognititionem, qua non magis intelligitur unus 
homo quam alius, et tamen quod tali cognititione magis congnoscitur sive intelligitur homo 
quam asinus. Et hoc non est aliud quam quod talis cognitio aliquo modo assimilationis magis 
assimilatur homini quam asino, et non magis isti homini quam illi”. Cf. Commentarium in 
Librum Primum Sententiarum 2.8 (OTh II, 278).  
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quality”.212 If we do this, then there seems no reason to suppose that mental 
act ‘x’ will be more similar to other mental acts than extra-mental things. The 
similarity relationship becomes focused on the content of the act, rather than 
its ontological status as a mental quality.  
 
This response has some merit, but it still would not fix the reference of the 
cognitive act on the desired class outside the mind. Leaving aside similarity 
based on existing in the mind as opposed to external reality, the fact that the 
concept ‘human’ is indeterminate means it will be more similar to other 
indeterminate concepts about ‘human’ than it will to individual humans. The 
concept of ‘human’ would still be more similar to partially indeterminate 
concepts like ‘caucasoid human’ or ‘mongoloid human’ more than the fully 
determinate particular humans it supposed to signify.213 The quality of 
indeterminacy thus undermines the aim of establishing similarity between the 
concept of man and really existent particular human beings. The proposed 
response made on Ockham’s behalf fails to address the objection.  
 
Even if Ockham were able to solve the issue of concepts signifying other 
mental entities, he would lack an explanation for why concepts signify class ‘x’ 
rather than class ‘y’ extra-mental objects. I can find no passage explaining why 
                                                   
212  McCord Adams, 1978, p.450. She concedes, “I have not found a passage in which Ockham 
explicitly makes this correction”.   
213 I use these examples reluctantly, and only because the categories are still in use in forensic 
anthropology. No offence whatsoever is intended. Furthermore, I am using the term ‘man’ 
rather than ‘human being’ only because Ockham himself used the equivalent word in Latin. 
Otherwise I would adopt the latter term.  
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the concept of human would signify all particular humans out there in the 
world, rather than all particular horses. Unlike other forms of signification, 
the notion of act signification is obscure and in need of elucidation. It is prima 
facie clear how pictures signify particular objects in the external world. The 
colors are similar, and the objects delineated in the two-dimensional 
photographic space are analogous to objects in some real three-dimensional 
space. But what sort of story can we provide for concepts that might explain 
their comparative similarity to certain particular objects in the external 
world? As Adams remarks, “an act of the intellect that is of a green house 
cannot resemble a green house the way a colour photograph of the green 
house can. For it is a mental quality and is not coloured or extended.”214 This 
seems to me a valid observation. We need a new theory of resemblance to 
explain why certain acts have a comparative similarity to particular objects. 
Ockham ultimately fails to supply such an observation.  
 
Claude Panaccio has attempted to address this resemblance criticism by 
explaining resemblance in using the analogy of 'static' physical acts. Using the 
analogy of a hand grasping a ball, he attempts to make intelligible the unusual 
signification of cognitive acts:  
“the acts ‘resemble’ objects in the same way that the posture of my fist 
in the act of grasping an object comes to resemble that object: It is 
neither qualitative resemblance in the Aristotelian sense (as between 
two red things, or two round things), nor essential similitude (as 
between two nuthatches, or between a dog and a horse), nor 
                                                   
214 McCord Adams, 1978, p.451.  
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perceptual likeness (as between a photograph or a statue and the 
pictured object). The relevant Ockhamistic connection typically 
follows upon a causal link and thus differs from both qualitative 
resemblance and essential similitude by being asymmetrical; a foot 
track, in this sense, is a similitude of the foot, but not conversely”.215 
 
To my mind there are multiple serious issues with this explanation. However, 
I will focus on what seems to be the fundamental flaw of the account. Pace 
Panaccio, there seems to be a disanalogy between his example of a static 
physical action (the grasping of a ball) and the metaphysical/cognitive action 
of grasping an object. As Panaccio himself states, “A mental act for Ockham is 
not an action in the modern sense, or a gesture, or a movement. It is more like 
an actualized state in the mind”.216 An 'act' according to Ockham is the 
exercise of a metaphysical capacity. Granted, physical actions are a kind of 
metaphysical act. But they are vastly different to the exercise of other 
metaphysical capacities, such as the use of the capacities of the mind. Mental 
acts are not physical or extended. Comparing mental acts to molds reduces 
cognitions to quasi-physical objects, and there is no textual justification for 
such an interpretation. The mere fact that they are both metaphysical acts will 
not suffice to secure Panaccio’s conclusion. Furthermore, working against 
Panaccio's account is Ockham's belief in non-reductive similarity. Ockham 
was adamant that similarity obtained at an object level, and was not reducible 
to certain qualities of the objects.217 However, the similarity of a mold to 
                                                   
215 Claude Panaccio, Ockham on Concepts (Burlington: Ashgate, 2004), p.124-125.  
216 Ibid., p.123.  
217 Commentarium in Librum Primum Sententiarum 2.6 (OTh II, 211-12).  
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certain objects seems to be reducible to a kind of qualitative resemblance: the 
contours of the mold mirror the contours of the object. Insofar as it is a kind 
of qualitative resemblance, Ockham would repudiate this as an unnecessarily 
reductive account of similarity.  
 
Ultimately, Ockham's account of act signification needs to be interpreted 
along the lines of his non-reductivism. Considering the metaphysical 
constraints he placed on the way we explicate mental acts, there is no way to 
explain the comparative similarity relation that holds between mental acts 
and classes of things in the world. We need to take similarity as an irreducible 
feature of our mental acts.  
 
Here lies the ultimate issue. To take similarity as a brute fact seems very 
implausible. It would mean that, for instance, there was nothing in common 
between the similarity between my thought of a given object and that object 
and the similarity between another person’s thought of that same object and 
that object. This is indeed a difficult view to accept. Intuitively there is some 
sort of reductive explanation for the similarities between our experiences of 
the same object. Yet Ockham does not allow for this.  
 
McCord Adams ends her essay by writing “Ockham’s doctrine of natural 
signification must be pronounced a failure”.218 I would not go as far as labeling 
it a ‘failure’. Rather, I would simply call it far less plausible than other 
alternative theories. Ockham’s razor only applies if the competing theories are 
                                                   
218 McCord Adams, 1978, p.456.  
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on par with each other in their explanatory value. Yet his theory fails to 
measure up to that offered by Scotus. If the latter has greater explanatory 
power, we have no reason to abandon it.  
 
Conclusion: 
 
Ockham's account of the knowledge of particulars was a radical departure 
from the conventional Thomistic account of cognition adopted by most of his 
peers. He rejected the idea that knowledge entailed an isomorphism between 
the mind and world. Ockham's approach was to posit a primitive similarity 
relation obtaining between cognitive acts and classes of really existing 
material things. He argued that this relation was sufficient to explain the 
specific content of our thoughts. Ockham also dissented from Scotus and 
Aquinas in claiming that we can know singular things in se. To explain how 
this was possible, he developed a novel causal theory of reference, according 
to which causal relations between thoughts and particular objects fix reference.  
 
I have argued that the 'divine omnipotence' objection often made of Ockham's 
causal theory rests upon a misinterpretation. Ockham's philosophy of 
cognition is grounded in a naturalistic theory of causality, and he does not 
intend his theological speculations to affect this naturalistic account. But 
whilst his causal theory withstands criticism, Ockham’s theory of act 
signification does not fare as well. Ockham does not provide an adequate 
explanation for the theory. And even when one explores the options that 
Ockham had available, there still seems to be no adequate answer. Ultimately, 
his non-reductive account of act signification seems implausible.     
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In my concluding chapter I will emphasise how Scotus avoids these difficulties 
encountered by Ockham. Scotus, like Ockham, developed a theory of intuitive 
cognition to explain our grasp of singulars. However, he did not adopt a 
conceptualist explanation for our cognition of essences. According to Scotus, 
essences really exist in things, and we perceive these essences in intuitive 
cognition. This, I will suggest, is the fundamental reason why Scotus’s account 
succeeds and Ockham’s fails. Ockham – with his reductionist metaphysics – 
was unable to give a coherent explanation of our grasp of the essences of 
objects in intuitive cognition. Scotus had a metaphysical system that allowed 
him to provide such a story.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 121 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 122 
Chapter VI: Conclusion – A comparison of 
Aquinas, Ockham and Scotus  
 
We come to the end of our examination of the three major medieval theories 
of singular cognition. Each of the three theories is significantly different – a 
fact that often goes unacknowledged. Aquinas provides us with a kind of 
mediated realism, Scotus abandons the notion of an intelligible species and 
posits the notion of intuitive cognition, and Ockham boldly abandons key 
elements of Aristotelian essentialism. Each philosopher drew upon 
sophisticated philosophical machinery to justify his claims.   
 
In this chapter I aim to provide a brief summary of the argument that has 
been made throughout this thesis, as well as to examine the insights that can 
be drawn from the discussion in the past few chapters. Even though I have 
examined just a small area of the philosophy of cognition, it seems that there 
are some key insights that can be gained.   
 
1. The problem of cognition of singulars:  
 
This thesis is focused on the problem of the knowledge of singulars. The stated 
aim was to provide an evaluation of three significant high medieval theories of 
singular cognition. I have examined how these theories reconciled Aristotelian 
claims about the mind’s exclusive orientation toward universals with the view 
that we do indeed have singular knowledge. As is hopefully evident, a grasp of 
singular objects is essential if we are to make judgements about particular 
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objects. And insofar as this is a fundamental operation by which we know the 
corporeal world, we can say that singular knowledge is essential to any kind of 
rational human action. The problem of the knowledge of singulars is thus an 
important problem – perhaps more important than has been acknowledged in 
the literature to date.   
 
1.1 Aquinas on the inner sensorium:  
 
Aquinas tries to resolve the problem of singular knowledge by suggesting, at 
certain points in his work, that the intellect ‘returns to the phantasms’, and 
elsewhere, that we have a special sensory capacity, the cogitative power, that 
is capable of conceptualising singular objects. Aquinas’s solution is ultimately 
to posit a second means of cognizing objects, parallel to his formal reception 
account.  
 
I argued that Aquinas’s notion of the conversio fails to provide an adequate 
explanation of singular cognition – it merely points to where an answer might 
lie, rather than providing a comprehensive solution. I also considered his 
notion of the cogitative power, and claimed that it solves one problem only to 
create another in its wake. The cogitative power, on Aquinas’s account, is 
capable of grasping common natures as present in concrete material objects. 
But insofar as this is the case, why is a notion of formal reception necessary at 
all? The original notion of formal reception was based on the assumption that 
only dematerialized species of objects could be intelligible to the mind. In 
positing a cogitative power Aquinas undermines this assumption – indeed, he 
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is contradicting one of the key suppositions of his broader philosophy of mind.  
This ‘solution’, founded upon a fractured system, seems rather unattractive.  
 
1.2 Ockham’s ‘act theory’ of singular cognition:   
 
I also examined the account of singular cognition provided by William of 
Ockham. Ockham’s account rests upon two complementary cognitive theories 
– his act theory of cognition, and his causal theory of thought character. I 
offered the following interpretation: Cognitive acts, according to Ockham, can 
themselves signify specific classes of objects in the extra-mental world. And 
the causal pathways that obtain between certain thoughts and particular 
objects are sufficient to make the thought about on one particular object 
within the relevant class.  
 
I argued that Ockham’s causal theory is coherent, whilst his act theory is in 
dire need of further development. Ockham, in his non-reductionist approach, 
chooses not to explain how cognitive acts come to signify specific classes of 
objects in the extramental world. He sets strict constraints on how we can 
explain similarity relations between mental entities and objects in the external 
world. And this creates what seems to be an intractable obstacle to explaining 
the notion of ‘act signification’. Ockham’s non-reductive theory thus seems to 
go too far – in trying to simplify explanations, Ockham loses the very ability to 
provide an adequate explanation.  
 
1.3 Scotus on intuitive cognition:  
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Scotus’s claim is that we can have intuitive cognition of individual 
instantiations of common natures in the external world, and we can literally 
perceive as qualities of the entity their existence and spatial proximity to us. 
The cognitive act is produced by the object itself, acting with our agent 
intellect.  
 
In the end, Scotus’s theory is not without its own issues. It is rather complex219 
and certain aspects are in need of further development (such as the distinction 
between true intuitive cognitions and merely apparent ones). Nevertheless, 
his account of the process of singular cognition – a departure from the formal 
reception account – seems free of serious objections. His notion of singular 
cognition sits without tension alongside his theory of abstractive cognition, 
judgement and reasoning.  
 
Scotus avoids the main error found in Aquinas’s account. According to 
Aquinas, cognition involves a reception of forms into the mind. Insofar as this 
is the case, we cannot have knowledge of particulars, as we can only receive 
universal forms. Scotus, in contrast, argues that it is sufficient for a nature to 
be present to the mind, rather than present in it. Insofar as individual natures 
can be present to the mind, we are able to grasp individual objects under a 
                                                   
219 It is perhaps important to note that current models of perception and cognition are 
themselves rather complex. Complexity, then, is perhaps not a weakness of any philosophical 
account of cognition. Cf. Stump’s assessment of Aquinas’s cognitive psychology: “Although 
Aquinas’s account is complicated, then, its complication seems to reflect accurately the 
complexity of our cognitive processes as we currently understand them.” Eleonore Stump, 
Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003), p.269.  
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certain aspect (although we can never grasp what makes them absolutely 
distinct from every other thing). Scotus thus manages to circumvent the 
problem of individual knowledge encountered by Aquinas. It seems there is 
significant merit in modifying the Aristotelian formal reception account of 
cognition in the way Scotus did.  
 
Scotus also avoids the problems plaguing Ockham’s account. Ockham 
attempts to explain cognition by positing a similarity relation between 
cognitive acts and objects in the external world. The ‘fatal blow’ for Ockham 
seems almost self-inflicted – he refuses to provide an explanation for this 
notion of comparative similarity. And an explanation is clearly needed, 
because cognitive acts are intuitively very different in nature from the 
contents of the external world. Scotus, like Ockham, posits a relation of 
similarity between the contents of the mind and the world. But unlike Ockham, 
Scotus retained an essentialist metaphysics. Using this metaphysics, Scotus 
grounded his similarity account. There is, he claimed, a formal isomorphism 
between entities present to the mind and entities in their material existence. 
This is a far more satisfactory account of the similarity between mind and 
world than that provided by Ockham.  
 
Scotus, then, provides a coherent account of how the mind initially accesses 
singulars, and also provides a compelling account of what we can and cannot 
know about those singulars. He follows what seems to be a via media between 
the Aristotelianism of Aquinas and the conceptualist nominalism of Ockham. 
Though his theory would profit from further development, it does seem to be 
the best out of the three major theories proposed in the Middle Ages. It 
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provides a reasonable explanation of how structures in the mind mirror the 
structure of individual objects; it explains how our thoughts come to pick out 
individual objects rather than all the members of a class; and it gives a 
plausible account of how information about these objects enters into the 
conceptual realm.   
 
2. Two key conclusions  
 
One conclusion we can draw is that Scotus should be given greater 
prominence in historical narratives about medieval theories of singular 
cognition. As stated in chapter I, historians of philosophy generally argue 
that Aquinas or Ockham provided the most plausible account of singular 
cognition in the Middle Ages. Either this, or they deny that a coherent account 
was ever provided during the period. I have argued that Aquinas and 
Ockham’s accounts face serious objections. Duns Scotus, in contrast, offers a 
defensible solution. I would argue for a reconsideration of traditional 
historical narratives, such that greater emphasis is placed on Scotus’s 
contribution.  
 
Why hasn’t this occurred already? There seem to me to be two reasons. One is 
that Scotus’s writings on singular cognition are very fragmented. Many 
scholars find it quite difficult to reconstruct a coherent theory from these 
disparate remarks.220 The second reason is that those who do attempt an 
                                                   
220 Pasnau, for example, basically disregards evidence from the fourth book of the Ordinatio 
and the Quodlibet on account of its conflict with strong comments in his earlier writings. This 
leads to what Pasnau himself calls an “uninteresting” interpretation. See, Robert Pasnau, 
 128 
interpretation do so in the context of a discussion of scepticism.221 Intuitive 
cognition is presented as a response to sceptical concerns, rather than a 
solution to the problem of singular knowledge.  
 
I hope to have shown that it is in fact possible to ‘reconstruct’ an account of 
Scotus’s mature position. And a coherent theory emerges when we examine 
Scotus’s fragmented remarks on intuitive cognition. Bear in mind as well that 
aspects of Aquinas’s cognitive psychology have been reconstructed from short, 
disjointed remarks. 222 If scholars are willing to accept Aquinas’s account, then 
they should also accept a reconstruction of Scotus’s thought on the matter.  
 
Concerning the scholarly focus on scepticism, it is important to realise that 
Scotus was more preoccupied with developing an account of singular 
                                                                                                                                                 
‘Cognition’, in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006), pp.298-300.  
221 Cf. Alexander Broadie: “[Scotus’s doctrine of intuitive cognition] is evidently conceived by 
him as a response to what he clearly regards as a skeptical implication in the doctrine of 
perceptual cognition that he inherited”. Why Scottish Philosophy Matters (Edinburgh: The 
Saltire Society, 2000), p.39; Leen Spruit: “In Duns’ epistemology, intuition of the singular has 
a complementary role with respect to abstractive knowledge, which is unable to guarantee 
that its objects actually exist”. See Leen Spruit, Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to 
Knowledge vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), p.258. See also Katherine Tachau, Vision and 
Certitude in the Age of Ockham (Leiden: Brill, 1988), pp.75-81. Tachau does acknowledge that 
“the problem of existential certitude was nevertheless relatively peripheral in Scotus’s 
epistemology”. Ironically, Tachau devotes a very lengthy part of her discussion to examining 
the skeptical connotations of Scotus’s doctrine.   
222 The notion of the conversio ad phantasma is a good example of this.  
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knowledge rather than guarding against scepticism. My discussion in 
chapter IV gives sufficient evidence of this. To provide a complete account of 
Scotus’s theory requires that one discuss his concern with the problem of 
singular cognition. Contemporary interpreters should be mindful of this.  
 
The second conclusion is substantive rather than historical. Scotus offers a 
genuine solution to the ‘Myth of the Given’ objection that Wilfred Sellars 
levelled at Aquinas. Sellars, as I will briefly explain here, criticised Aquinas for 
attributing a kind of ‘pseudo-intentionality’ to the senses. This was one 
particular example of the error Sellars called ‘The Myth of the Given’. Scotus, I 
argue, manages to avoid this objection, and offers a genuine way forward to 
anyone trying to develop a Neo-Scholastic account of cognition.  
 
Recall that Aquinas imputes certain cognitive capacities to the inner senses – 
in particular the cogitative sense. The cogitative sense is capable, according to 
Aquinas, of making primitive judgements about material particulars:  
“The cogitative faculty apprehends the individual thing as existing in a 
common nature. It is able to do this because it is united to intellect in one and 
the same subject. Hence it is aware of a man as this man, and of a tree as 
this tree”.223  
 
                                                   
223 Sententia Libri De Anima, 2.13, n.206-210 (XLV, p.122): “Nam cogitativa apprehendit 
individuum, ut existens sub natura communi; quod contingit ei, inquantum unitur 
intellectivae in eodem subiecto; unde cognoscit hunc hominem prout est hic homo, et hoc 
lignum prout est hoc lignum.” 
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Sellars rightly objected to the theory that the senses have a kind of proto-
intentionality.224 To attribute conceptual abilities to the senses is, on an 
Aristotelian account, to confuse their role as causes of cognition with the idea 
that they cognize objects themselves (i.e. that they belong to the cognitive or 
‘intentional’ order). The peculiar way in which forms are present in the senses 
does not in itself entail that the senses are capable of knowledge.  The 
“pseudo-intentionality” of the senses is “mistaken for the genuine 
intentionality of the cognitive order”.225 The reality is that  “acts of sense are 
intrinsically non-cognitive and do not present anything to us as being of a 
kind—e. g. white or triangular. . . ”.226  
 
It seems to me that we find in Scotus a sensitivity to this issue. Scotus was 
aware that the senses, though possessing a relation of isomorphism with 
objects in the world, nevertheless did not possess the uniquely cognitive 
attribute of intentionality. In the Commentarium in Librum Quartum 
Sententiarum, Scotus distinguishes between sense experience and the 
knowledge provided by the intellect. He discusses the need for the intellect to 
                                                   
224 By proto-intentionality, I take it that he was referring to a subtle attribution of 
intentionality (‘aboutness’) to the inner senses. It is a proto-intentionality insofar as it 
provides the foundation for the fully-fledged intentionality (an intentionality that we are 
reflexively aware of) of thoughts about the world.   
225 ‘Being and Being Known’, in Science, Perception, and Reality (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul Ltd. 1963), pp. 41–59, n.17. (The final part of this citation refers to the relevant section 
number in the essay). Sellars' critique, by his own admission, relies on a Kantian account of 
the senses.  
226 “Being and Being Known”, n.27.  
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intuitively know what the senses know, so that there is a possibility of 
verifying the truth of contingent propositions:  
“[That] the intellect not only knows universals…but also that it can know 
intuitively what the sense knows…[is] proved from the fact that the intellect 
knows contingently true propositions…but the truth of these concerns objects 
known intuitively, that is to say, under their existential aspect, which is 
something known by sense. It follows that [concepts of singulars] can be 
found in the intellect”.227 
Though Scotus does not state it explicitly, the implication is that sense 
experience of singulars is insufficient to play the cognitive role of justification. 
Singular objects need to appear in the intellectual realm if we are to verify 
contingent propositions – hence the need for intellectual intuition. Through 
intuitive cognition, the intellect is able to know “the nature [of a thing] qua 
existing”.228  
 
Scotus, then, was aware of the objection Sellars would make to medieval 
theories of cognition. Scotus recognized the need to posit a uniquely cognitive 
                                                   
227 “Intellectus non tantum cognoscat universalia…sed etiam intuitive cognoscat illa quae 
sensus cognoscit…quod cognoscit porpositiones contingenter veras…illarum autem veritas est 
de obiectis ut intuitive cognitis, sub ratione scilicet exsistentiae sub qua cognoscuntur a sensu. 
Sequitur quod in intellectu possunt inveniri [conceptibus singularum].” Commentarium in 
Librum Quartum Sententiarum, 45.3.17 (XXI, pp.348-349). Translation taken from Alan B. 
Wolter O.F.M. and Marylin McCord Adams, ‘Memory and Intuition: A Focal Debate in 
Fourteenth Century Cognitive Psychology’, Franciscan Studies 53 (1993), pp.175-230.   
228 To quote the precise Latin: “Illam autem naturam ut exsistentem intuitive cognoscit 
intellectus” Ibid. (XXI, p.366).  
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grasp of singular objects. Without it, we lose the foundation of our epistemic 
edifice.   
 
To respond to the criticism, Scotus developed his theory of intuitive cognition. 
Intuitive cognition was a means by which to explain how information 
regarding material objects ‘got into’ the realm of cognition. The way in which 
this happened, Scotus claimed, was by virtue of the mind achieving epistemic 
contact with objects in themselves. The mind did not merely work with sense 
representations, but rather was able to reach out and apprehend the essences 
of objects themselves. In doing so, the mind achieved a semantic or 
intentional grasp of objects, not a mere sensory acquaintance.229  
 
With this response, Scotus provided an answer to the objection that Sellars 
would make 650 years later. Scotus avoided the aforementioned manifestation 
of ‘The Myth of the Given’. The cornerstones of our cognitive edifice, claimed 
Scotus, are singular objects that are intuitively grasped by the mind. He did 
not just take intentionality as a ‘given’. With the notion of intuitive cognition 
he explained how data from the external world acquired intentionality.   
 
Those wishing to develop a Neo-Scholastic philosophy of cognition would be 
wise to take note of this insight offered by Scotus. Though Aquinas’s 
philosophy of cognition may have been accurate in many respects, there is 
certainly a shortcoming in this crucial area. A notion of intuitive cognition is 
                                                   
229 This passage is noticeably bereft of footnotes. I have left it so on account of the exhaustive 
discussion of intuitive cognition in chapter IV. Relevant references can be found in that 
chapter.  
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essential to bridging the epistemic gap between the extra-mental world and 
the world of thought.  
 
Conclusion:  
 
In this thesis I have examined a particular topic of debate in medieval rational 
psychology – the problem of the knowledge of particulars. I presented the 
views of three philosophers on the subject – Aquinas, Scotus and Ockham – 
and suggested that Scotus provided the most promising account. I do not 
pretend to have proved the coherence of Scotus’s broader rational psychology 
and philosophy of mind. Indeed it may be that on most other topics Aquinas 
and/or Ockham are far more convincing. Nevertheless, Scotus account of the 
first stages of cognition – the initial operation of simple apprehension, seems 
correct. For those working to develop a coherent philosophy of cognition 
based on medieval philosophy, I would think it appropriate to integrate 
Scotus’s insights into their theory.  
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